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I. INTRODUCTION
Several years ago I tried to teach my two older children the game
of poker. Poker is a game of skill, although luck plays an undeniable
role. I fancied myself somewhat of a master of the game, going back
to my boyhood days in Brooklyn. But my children were suburban
kids who had not yet learned to play. I described the rules and we
played for a while but they seemed to be slow learners, even though
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
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they are bright and had expressed an interest in learning. Then I sug-
gested we play for money-pennies actually, but this new twist in the
game had an interesting effect. With a stake in the game, they learned
much more quickly.
This episode made me think about several things--dares, and
challenges, and bets, and motivation. Now, in my youth, a dare was
enough to induce at least some otherwise rational people to attempt
some very risky feats of foolishness. Not in my neighborhood, how-
ever. We were too sophisticated. But a bet-that was different. "I'll
bet you a dollar you can't climb the fence." This challenge, coupled
with the dollar reward, provided the added incentive that a mere dare
to perform this death-defying act could not. And, unlike the dare,
once accepted there was no backing out. After all, backing out at that
point would cost a dollar as well as the loss of face that failing to meet
a publicly accepted challenge would bring.
Oh, how powerful is the combined incentive to succeed/disincen-
tive to fail of the bet in which the contingency is in the control of the
bettor. And oh how seductive a motivator it is to induce attempted
performance that would not otherwise seriously be considered.
This Article suggests that society can harness the psychological
power of the bet to accomplish a number of very useful social objec-
tives. Its thesis is that a governmental offer to wager with its citizens
on the performance of certain acts by them that the government
would like to bring about can be a new and powerful technique of
social engineering. If our society were differently constructed-if
only we had true community-we would solve the social and health
problems addressed here through love. Alas, that millennium has not
yet arrived. In a world without community, with few social norms,
without love, we nonetheless need ways of solving social problems.
And the means we use should at least 'treat people with respect and
dignity. Our existing methods frequently are ineffective, sometimes
perpetuating the problems we seek to solve. Often they rob people of
their dignity. When a society fails to offer any real hope to many of
its disadvantaged, social problems are inevitable. Until we can recon-
struct society, we need ways of coping with life outside the garden.
This proposal is designed to encourage us to think differently about
our methods of solving social problems. The proposal is tentative and
exploratory, and certainly not ready to be implemented. It is offered
in the spirit of stimulating discussion about new regulatory
approaches to old, as well as newly emerging, social problems.
This proposal could be seen as deriving from the utilitarianism of
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, or from modern economic
[Vol. 45:737
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theory. I prefer the paradigm of psychology. In what follows in Sec-
tion II, I first analyze several principles of behavioral psychology,
showing how wagering with the government can be seen as a new
technique combining two established types of behavior therapy-posi-
tive reinforcement and aversive conditioning. Behaviorism, at least
the radical behaviorism associated with B.F. Skinner--evoking the
spectre of manipulative behavior modification of the Clockwork
Orange variety-has gotten a bad name. But developments in psy-
chology in the 1970's and 1980's, particularly in cognitive and social
psychology, have reshaped the traditional behavioral model into a less
mechanistic and more individually focused paradigm that provides a
more enriched explanation of how people learn and behave.1 In Sec-
tion II, I also show how a number of important insights derived from
social and cognitive theory can be drawn upon to supplement the
traditional behavioral model in explaining the psychological power of
the bet.
In Section III, I then suggest several applications of this tech-
nique in the public health and social service areas. I show how a
number of pressing social problems, ranging from drug addiction to
productivity among civil servants to the welfare system, can be under-
stood behaviorally, and can be remedied through creative applications
of behavioral psychology, such as the governmental wager. I suggest
that the government negotiate with individuals with a variety of social
and health problems in an effort to motivate them to undertake
changes in their socially injurious behaviors. The government could
offer volunteers wishing to rid themselves of such behavior patterns
the opportunity to enter into a "wagering" agreement or contingency
contract with the government in which explicit goals would jointly be
set, and the individual's motivation to achieve them would be
enhanced through a combination of agreed-upon rewards for success
and penalties or aversive consequences for failure. After considering
these three areas--drug addiction, public employee productivity, and
welfare-as illustrative, I suggest a number of other applications of
wagering in both the public and private sectors. Some of these appli-
cations may prove unfeasible, and others may be too politically con-
1. Not all would agree with the synthesis presented here. There remain a variety of
camps within psychology: those committed to a more traditional, behavioral orientation, those
more cognitively oriented, those more focused on social psychology, those who see themselves
as humanistic psychologists, and those more analytically or psychodynamically oriented. See,
e.g., Duke & Nowicki, Theories of Personality and Psychopathology: Schools Derived from
Psychology and Philosophy, in 1 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 432 (5th ed.
1989). The persistence of these different perspectives within psychology, each of which is built
on a somewhat different conceptual model, makes it unlikely that any one synthesis, including
mine, would achieve universal acceptance.
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troversial to attempt. They are offered merely to illustrate possible
applications of the technique, and not as proposals ready for
implementation.
In Section IV, I analyze the legality and constitutionality of gov-
ernmental wagering for social change, distinguishing the wager from
illegal gambling and comparing it to such arrangements as contin-
gency clauses in construction contracts, tax credits, and plea bargain-
ing, all of which the courts regularly enforce. This Article suggests
governmental wagering as a new alternative approach to accomplish-
ing social change. Moreover, because voluntariness is its hallmark,
wagering can be seen as less intrusive on constitutional values than
existing approaches. Accordingly, Section V concludes that both the
public and private sectors should seriously consider harnessing the
power of the bet to help individuals achieve their greatest potential.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF THE BET
A. The Wager as an Application of Principles of Behavioral
Psychology
Seen through the lens of behavioral psychology, the bet can be
understood as combining principles of positive reinforcement and
aversive conditioning, both modern applications of behavior therapy.
Behavior therapy generally is defined as the clinical application of
experimentally derived principles of psychological learning theory to
teach adaptive behavior or to modify maladaptive behavior by means
of systematic manipulation of the environment.2 The basic principle
2. The term "behavior modification" is sometimes used, but I prefer the narrower term
"behavior therapy." "Behavior modification" is often defined expansively to include all
treatments designed to bring about a change in behavior, including psychosurgery, electronic
stimulation of the brain, electroconvulsive therapy and psychotropic medication. Eg., STAFF
OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
93D CONG., 2D SESS., INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION 1, 11 (1974) [hereinafter INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION]. A report prepared by the National Institute of Mental Health
uses a narrower definition conforming to professional usage: "[B]ehavior modification will be
used to refer to procedures that are based on the explicit and systematic application of
principles and technology derived from research in experimental psychology, procedures that
involve some change in the social or environmental context of a person's behavior." B.
BROWN, L. WIENCKOWSKI & S. STOLZ, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: PERSPECTIVES ON A
CURRENT ISSUE 3 (DHEW Pub. No. (ADM) 75-202, 1975) [hereinafter NIMH BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION REPORT]; see also C. FRANKS & G. WILSON, ANNUAL REVIEW OF
BEHAVIOR THERAPY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (1975); Alberts & Edelstein, Training in
Behavior Therapy, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION AND
THERAPY 213, 215-16 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK]; Krasner,
History ofBehavior Modification, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra, at 3, 8-10. "Applied
behavior analysis," a closely related but narrower term, applies primarily to applications of
"Skinnerian" or operant conditioning. See Goldiamond, Singling Out Behavior Modification
[Vol. 45:737
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underlying most behavior therapy techniques is that behavior is gov-
erned primarily by the environmental events or consequences that fol-
low it. Therefore, the behavior therapist directly manipulates these
consequences in order to alter the patient's problematic behavior.'
Behavior therapy postulates that maladaptive behaviors are
learned and reinforced by the same principles of conditioning as "nor-
mal" responses, and that they therefore may be altered through the
systematic application of principles of learning theory validated
experimentally in the animal, and now the human, laboratory.4
for Legal Regulation: Some Effects on Patient Care, Psychotherapy, and Research in General,
17 ARIZ. L. REV. 105, 107-09 (1975); Milan, Applied Behavior Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK, supra, at 67. In common usage, the terms "behavior therapy," "behavior
modification," and "applied behavior analysis" are more or less synonymous. See Beck,
Behavior Therapy, in AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N COMM'N ON PSYCHIATRIC THERAPIES,
THE PSYCHIATRIC THERAPIES 485, 486 (T. Karasu ed. 1984); Krasner, supra, at 9. For other
definitions, see H. KALISH, FROM BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 3
(1981); Beck, supra, at 486-87; Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in
Mental Institutions and Prisons, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 39, 44 (1975); Krasner, supra, at 8-10; and
Whitman, Behavior Modification: Introduction and Implications, 24 DE PAUL L. REV. 949,
952-53 (1975). The definition of "behavior therapy" offered in the text, although widely
accepted, is admittedly oversimplified. For example, techniques such as "modeling," see infra
note 32, and "systematic desensitization," see J. WOLPE, PSYCHOTHERAPY BY RECIPROCAL
INHIBITION (1958); Beck, supra, at 497, both important techniques of behavior therapy, do not
easily meet the conditions of the definition. For comprehensive reviews of the various
techniques of behavior therapy, see A. BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION
(1969); CONTEMPORARY BEHAVIOR THERAPY: CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL
FOUNDATIONS (G. Wilson & C. Franks eds. 1982) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY BEHAVIOR
THERAPY]; E. GAMBRILL, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: HANDBOOK OF ASSESSMENT,
INTERVENTION AND EVALUATION (1977); M. GOLDFRIED & G. DAVISON, CLINICAL
BEHAVIOR THERAPY (1976); INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra; A. KAZDIN, BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION IN APPLIED SETRINGS (3d ed. 1984); R. RIMM & J. MASTERS, BEHAVIOR
THERAPY: TECHNIQUES AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (2d ed. 1979); G. WILSON & F.
O'LEARY, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR THERAPY (1980); J. WOLPE, THE PRACTICE OF
BEHAVIOR THERAPY (1973); Beck, supra; Brady, Behavior Therapy, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 2143 (3d ed. 1980); and Nathan, Behavior Therapy, in
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 391 (3d ed. 1974).
3. See NIMH BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 1; Atthowe, Behavior
Modification, Behavior Therapy and Environmental Design, 18 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 637, 639-40
(1975); Ayllon, Behavior Modification in Institutional Settings, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 3 (1975);
Friedman, supra note 2, at 44; Klofas & Duffee, The Change Grid and the Active Client:
Challenging the Assumptions of Change Agentry in the Penal Process, 8 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
95 (1981).
4. See Agras, Learning Theory, in 1 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra
note 1, at 262; RESEARCH TASK FORCE OF THE NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH,
RESEARCH IN THE SERVICE OF MENTAL HEALTH 325 (DHEW Pub. No. (ADM) 75-236,
1975) [hereinafter RESEARCH IN THE SERVICE OF MENTAL HEALTH]; Whitman, supra note 2,
at 952. For alternative perspectives criticizing the predominant role of learning theory in
human learning, see Brewer, There Is No Convincing Evidence for Operant or Classical
Conditioning in Adult Humans, in 1 COGNITION AND THE SYMBOLIC PROCESSES 1 (1974);
and McKeachie, The Decline and Fall of the Laws of Learning, 3 EDUC. RESEARCHER 7 (Mar.
1974).
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Although principles of behavior modification were first introduced
into clinical settings less than forty years ago, the past twenty-five
years have marked a phenomenal growth in their development and
application. Evidence of the general acceptance of behavioral treat-
ment, and of its increasing influence, can be found in the emergence
since 1963 of at least eleven new research journals devoted to behavior
therapy,5 the widespread availability of courses in behavior therapy in
psychology doctoral programs, medical schools, and psychiatric resi-
dency programs, and the dramatic growth in government-funded
research devoted to the field.6 Moreover, since 1973, when an Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association Task Force concluded that behavior ther-
apy had progressed sufficiently that it had "much to offer" psychiatry,
it has become an increasingly accepted part of modern clinical
practice.
Behavior therapy is now widely used for psychological disorders,
psychophysiological disorders, marital and family problems, manag-
ing institutional populations, and children's behavior problems.8
5. See, e.g., ADVANCES BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY (1978); BEHAV. MODIFICATION
(1977); BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY (1963); BEHAV. THERAPIST (1978); BEHAV. THERAPY
(1970); BEHAVIORISM (1973); BIOFEEDBACK & SELF-REG. (1973); COGNITIVE THERAPY &
RE. (1977); J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS (1966); J. BEHAV. MED. (1978); J. BEHAV.
THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY (1970). In addition, accounts of behavior therapy
and research have spread to the general psychiatric and psychological literature, and
textbooks, monographs, and printed proceedings of meetings are appearing at an increasing
rate. See Liberman & Bedell, Behavior Therapy, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY, supra note 1, at 1462-63; Beck, supra note 2, at 485; Brady, supra note 2, at
1824; Hoon & Lindsley, A Comparison of Behavior and Traditional Therapy Publication
Activity, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 694 (1974). For a graph illustrating the increase in articles
about behaviorism, see Willis & Giles, Behaviorism in the Twentieth Century: What We Have
Here is a Failure to Communicate, 9 BEHAV. THERAPY 15, 18 (1978) (using number of articles
about behaviorism referenced in READERS' GUIDE TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE, 1900-74).
For listings of more recent literature, see NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH
LIBRARY JOURNAL HOLDINGS LIST (1985); and NIMH BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION REPORT,
supra note 2, at 25-26. Although the largest growth spurt occurred prior to 1973, "[s]ince that
time the proliferation of experimental and clinical studies has continued, [and] the number of
textbooks [on behavior therapy] has grown exponentially." Beck, supra note 2, at 485.
6. See RESEARCH IN THE SERVICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 4, at 325, 329-30.
Sampled in a 1975 survey, eighty-four percent of schools providing doctoral training in
psychology offered a course in behavior modification. Id. at 325. Such courses are also offered
in medical schools and are required in 11% of psychiatric residency programs. Id. Moreover,
a 1973 American Psychiatric Association Task Force Report on Behavior Therapy in
Psychiatry recommended that premedical education include a psychology course devoted to
the experimental analysis of behavior, and that training in behavioral psychiatry be made
available to all psychiatric residents. Id. at 325-26; see also Benassi & Lanson, A Survey of the
Teaching of Behavior Modification in Colleges and Universities, 27 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1063
(1972).
7. See Beck, supra note 2, at 485.
8. See RESEARCH IN THE SERVICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 4, at 325; Beck,
supra note 2, at 485-86, 495.
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These techniques are now applied to virtually all types of mental ill-
ness, as well as a variety of other problems, by practitioners ranging
from psychiatrists and psychologists to parents, teachers, prison
guards, and hospital ward attendants, in settings extending from pri-
vate practice to hospitals, community mental health centers, schools,
prisons, and facilities for juveniles and the mentally retarded.9
The basic principles of learning theory that underlie the diverse
behavior therapy techniques can be traced to Ivan Pavlov's classic
experimental work with dogs.10 By pairing the ringing of a bell with
feeding, Pavlov conditioned the dogs to salivate at the sound of the
bell alone. The principles of learning that evolved from these early
studies may be classified into two major learning paradigms--classical
conditioning and operant conditioning.'" Classical conditioning,
based on Pavlov's work, involves respondent or reflex behavior, invol-
untary behavior mediated primarily by the autonomic nervous system
(such as salivation) which is elicited by a preceding stimulus. A neu-
tral (or "conditioned") stimulus (the bell in Pavlov's experiment)
which does not normally elicit a response repeatedly is paired with an
eliciting (or "unconditioned") stimulus (the food powder) that nor-
mally triggers a response (salivation) until the neutral stimulus itself
elicits the response, which is then called a "conditioned response" or
"conditioned reflex."' 2
Operant or instrumental conditioning, based on the experimental
work of E.L. Thorndike 13 and B.F. Skinner,14 involves operant behav-
ior-"voluntary'! behavioral responses emitted by the subject, as
9. See NIMH BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 3; RESEARCH IN THE
SERVICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 4, at 326; Nathan, supra note 2, at 398; Whitman,
supra note 2, at 953-54. For evidence of the wide-ranging application of behavior therapy in a
variety of clinical settings, see any recent issue of the journals cited supra note 6.
10. See I. PAVLOV, CONDITIONAL REFLEXES: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
PHYSIOLOGICAL ACTIVITY OF THE CEREBRAL CORTEX (1927); I. PAVLOV, WORK ON THE
DIGESTIVE GLANDS (1897); see also H. GLEITMAN, BASIC PSYCHOLOGY 71-77 (1983);
RESEARCH IN THE SERVICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 4, at 85.
11. H. GLEITMAN, supra note 10, at 71-90; RESEARCH IN THE SERVICE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, supra note 4, at 85-90. A theoretical reexamination of this traditional duality is
underway, and "there is reason to hope that simplification of behavior theory through
reduction to a single underlying type of behavior process is not far off." Id. at 4.
12. H. GLErrMAN, supra note 10, at 72-73. For a social cognitive account of classical
conditioning, see A. BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A
SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 183 (1986).
13. E. L. THORNDIKE, ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE
ASSOCIATIVE PROCESS IN ANIMALS, 2 PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS No. 8 (1898); E. L.
THORNDIKE, ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE: EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES (1911); E. L. THORNDIKE,
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEARNING (1932); see also H. GLEITMAN, supra note 10, at 78-81.
14. B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1953); B.F. SKINNER, THE
BEHAVIOR OF ORGANISMS (1938); see also H. GLEITMAN, supra note 10, at 84-88.
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opposed to reflexive behavior elicited by an environmental stimulus.
Operant behavior is influenced by subsequent stimulation: It is
strengthened or weakened by its consequences. Skinner found that a
rat in a box which contained a lever would sooner or later press the
lever. If the rat received a food pellet for pressing the bar, its bar
pressing behavior increased. If no food pellet was delivered when the
rat pressed the bar several times, it ceased to press the lever as fre-
quently. Skinner called this process of increasing or decreasing the
probability of future voluntary behavior through manipulation of its
consequences "operant conditioning.""5 By repeatedly presenting a
rat or a person with a rewarding or reinforcing stimulus (or a punish-
ing or aversive consequence), the rat or person learns to make (or to
avoid making) specific responses.
The origins of behavior therapy have been traced to two experi-
ments reported in the early 1920's that applied these basic principles
of learning theory, originally developed in experiments with animals,
to the behavior of children.16 J.B. Watson, the founder of modern
behavioral psychology, demonstrated that a fear response to a white
rat could be conditioned in a young infant by presenting the rat,
which previously did not elicit a fear reaction, to the child, followed
immediately by a loud noise, a stimulus to which the child had previ-
ously responded with fear. 7 After a series of such pairings the rat
itself elicited the fear response. Watson also suggested a number of
ways in which this conditioned response might be reversed by subse-
quent learning experiences. Mary Cover Jones subsequently applied
this insight to overcome a young boy's fear of rabbits by gradually
bringing a rabbit closer while he was eating food that he liked. I" In
15. B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR, supra note 14, at 62-66. Skinner's
operant conditioning paradigm bears a close resemblance to Bentham's principle of utility, see
J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1
(1789) ("Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and
pleasure. It is for them alone to ...determine what we shall do."); J. BENTHAM, THE
RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 19 (1830) ("Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human
action."), and to the model of modern economic theory that predicts behavior based on a
rational calculus of costs and benefits. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(2d ed. 1977). For a social cognitive account of operant conditioning, see A. BANDURA, supra
note 12, at 13-16, 106-14, 116, 121-22.
16. See Ferster, Behaviorism, Behavior Modification, and Behavior Therapy, in READINGS
IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 107, 108 (1975); Whitman, supra note 2, at 952.
17. Watson & Rayner, Conditioned Emotional Reactions, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1920). Watson's classic paper, often referred to as the "Behaviorist
Manifesto," was published in 1913. Watson, Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It, 20
PSYCHOLOGY REV. 158 (1913).
18. Jones, A Laboratory Study of Fear: The Case of Peter, PEDAGOGICAL SEMINARY 308
(1924); Jones, The Elimination of Children's Fears, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 382
(1924).
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the 1950's these principles began to be applied to the treatment of
severely disturbed patients,' 9 and they are now widely used for a great
variety of conditions.
Ideally, behavior therapy involves mutual agreement between
therapist and patient specifying both treatment goals and proce-
dures.20 First, the therapist must perform a "behavioral analysis," a
detailed description of the patient's problem behavior. The behavior
analysis is designed "to determine the specific context and settings of
daily life that distressed the patient and to ascertain the environmen-
tal responses that might maintain the patient's maladapted behav-
iors."'" Based on this analysis, the therapist selects and applies one or
more of the behavior modification techniques to the patient.
Behavior therapy techniques currently in clinical use may be
grouped roughly into three major categories: positive reinforcement,
aversion therapy, and systematic desensitization. The bet consists of a
combination of the first two.
Positive reinforcement methods are based on operant condition-
ing. They reward behavioral responses that are sought to be strength-
ened ("target responses") by following their occurrence with desirable
consequences ("reinforcers"). 22  Such reinforcers may range from
basic items like food, water, and a bed ("primary reinforcers") to
grounds privileges, movies, religious services, praise, attention, gold
stars, money, or tokens or points redeemable for other items or privi-
19. See, e.g., J. WOLPE, supra note 2; J. WOLPE & A. LAZARUS, BEHAVIOR THERAPY
TECHNIQUES (1966); Ayllon & Arzin, The Measurement and Reinforcement of Behavior of
Psychotics, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 357 (1965); Ayllon & Arzin, The
Psychiatric Nurse as a Behavioral Engineer, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 323
(1959); Beck, supra note 2, at 488-89; Eysenck, Discussion on the Role of the Psychologist in
Psychoanalytic Practice: The Psychologist as Technician, 45 PROC. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 447
(1952); Ferster & De Myer, The Development of Performances in Autistic Children in an
Automatically Controlled Environment, 13 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 312 (1961); Lindsley &
Skinner, A Method for the Experimental Analysis of the Behavior of Psychotic Patients, 9 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 419 (1954).
20. See NIMH BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 4; Friedman, supra
note 2, at 44; Goldiamond, supra note 2, at 133-36; Wilson & Davison, Behavior Therapy: A
Road to Self-Control, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 54 (Oct. 1975). Increasingly, this agreement is
reduced to writing. See Ayllon, supra note 3, at 11 ("A comprehensive therapy contract is
now in use which sets forth the expected behavior objectives of the treatment, the nature,
methods, and duration of the treatment, and the specific criteria and social values that will be
used to evaluate and measure the success of the treatment."). For a sample form contract used
by the University of Chicago Department of Psychiatry, see Goldiamond, Toward a
Constructional Approach to Social Problems: Ethical and Constitutional Issues Raised by
Applied Behavior Analysis, in 2 BEHAVIORISM 1, 78-80 (1974).
21. RESEARCH IN THE SERVICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 4, at 326; see also
Brady, supra note 2, at 2144.
22. See A. BANDURA, supra note 2, at 217-92; NIMH BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION
REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-6; Brady, supra note 2, at 2147-49.
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leges ("secondary reinforcers"). 23
The operation of positive reinforcement can be illustrated by a
technique frequently used in institutional settings-the token econ-
omy:24 Under the token economy, a quasi-economic incentive system
is established within an institutional setting under which desired
behavior is rewarded with tokens-"generalized" reinforcers-that
may be exchanged by the patient for items or privileges otherwise
unavailable. Inappropriate behavior can result in either the loss of
tokens or a failure to earn tokens. Because the availability of reinforc-
ers is contingent upon performance of the target behavior, that behav-
ior is strengthened in the patient much as bar-pressing activity was
strengthened in Skinner's rat.25 A variation on the token economy is
the "tier system," where privileges are dependent on the patient's
place in a hierarchy of tiers. In this system the patient earns his way
from an orientation level, in which privileges are scant or non-exis-
23. See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 2, at 955. Sometimes the term "primary reinforcers" is
used to refer to all items desired by the patient, while "secondary reinforcers" is used
synonymously with "generalized reinforcers" to refer to tokens, or points convertible by the
patient to "primary reinforcers." See, e.g., Wexler, Of Rights and Reinforcers, 11 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 957, 958 (1974). The selection of reinforcers appropriate to the patient in question
often is done through use of the "Premack Principle," which teaches that if the patient
naturally engages in certain behaviors with high frequency, then the opportunity to engage in
those behaviors can be used as a powerful reinforcer. See Premack, Toward Empirical
Behavior Laws: Positive Reinforcement, 66 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 219 (1959); see also Brady,
supra note 2, at 2149.
24. See T. AYLLON & N. ARZIN, THE TOKEN ECONOMY: A MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM
FOR THERAPY AND REHABILITATION (1968); Liberman & Bedell, supra note 5, at 1470; A.
KAZDIN, THE TOKEN ECONOMY: A REVIEW AND EVALUATION (1977); NIMH BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 5; Ayllon, supra note 3, at 5-6; Brady, supra note 2,
at 2147-49. For an analysis of the legal issues raised by the token economy, see Bentley, Major
Legal and Ethical Issues in Behavioral Treatment: Focus on Institutionalized Mental Patients,
5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 359 (1987); Wexler, supra note 23; and Wexler, Token and Taboo:
Behavior Modification, Token Economies, and the Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 81 (1973).
25. Skinner utilized hungry rats and pigeons in his experiments-those "deprived of food
for a certain length of time or until ... [their] usual body-weight has been slightly reduced"-
finding that "the frequency of response which results from reinforcement depends upon the
degree of deprivation at the time the response is observed." B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND
HUMAN BEHAVIOR, supra note 14, at 68. In a similar way, token economy programs
sometimes place the patient in a state of deprivation at the outset of therapy, providing even
primary reinforcers such as meals, water, and a bed only when the patient engages in target
behaviors. See NIMH BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 18-19; Wexler,
Behavior Modification Report and Legal Developments, 18 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 679, 681-82
(1975); Wexler, supra note 24, at 87-88. Professor Wexler has suggested that legal
developments such as Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), specifying minimum constitutional
standards for facilities for the mentally disabled, by defining as basic rights many of the
"primary" reinforcers provided only contingently in token economies, may render such
reinforcers legally unavailable in token programs. Wexler, supra, at 681-82; Wexler, supra
note 24, at 93-95.
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tent, upward through a ranked series of tiers with increasingly more
desirable privileges and conditions.26 The token economy and tier
system have been applied in a variety of settings--closed psychiatric
wards,27 prisons,28 facilities for delinquents,29 and schools for normal,
26. Wexler, supra note 24, at 88. The controversial Federal Bureau of Prisons' Project
START, conducted at the Federal Medical Center for Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri,
utilized this model from September, 1972, until February, 1974. At entry level, the prisoners
selected for the program, described as so repeatedly disruptive as to require continual
segregation from the rest of the prison population, were denied such basic privileges as daily
showers, exercise, visitors, reading material, personal property, and commissary privileges,
which could only be regained by behaving in conformity with the program goals. For a
description of Project START, see Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974);
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION, supra note 2,
at 31-32, 240-72; and Carlson, Behavior Modification in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1 NEw
ENG. J. PRISON L. 155, 159-63 (1974). Although the government terminated the controversial
START project, it became a model for other prison programs. Gaylin & Blatte, Behavior
Modification in Prisons, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 11, 25 (1974). Another controversial program
utilizing a tier system is Maryland's Patuxent Institute for "defective delinquents." See
Patuxent Institution, 5 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 116-267 (1977); Stanford, A
Model Clockwork-Orange Prison, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 9, 71-84; see
also Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (tier program in juvenile training
school). For a detailed description of the workings of a tier system used at a closed adolescent
treatment center, see INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION, supra note 2, at 358-71. As the reinforcer frequently used in the tier program
is the removal of unpleasant conditions, it may more aptly be termed a program of negative
reinforcement. See Shah, Basic Principles and Concepts, in CORRECTIONAL CLASSIFICATION
AND TREATMENT 123, 128 (1975).
27. Teodoro Ayllon and Nathan Arzin pioneered the token economy in the early 1960's
on a ward of chronically psychotic patients in an Illinois State Hospital. T. AYLLON & N.
ARZIN, supra note 24; see also A. KAZDIN, supra note 24; G. PAUL & R. LENTZ,
PSYCHOSOCIAL TREATMENT OF CHRONIC MENTAL PATIENTS: MILIEU VERSUS SOCIAL-
LEARNING PROGRAMS (1977); Atthowe & Krasner, Preliminary Report on the Application of
Contingent Reinforcement Procedures (Token Economy) on a "Chronic" Psychiatric Ward, 73
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 37 (1968); Beck, supra note 2, at 506; Boudewyns, Fry &
Nightingale, Token Economy Programs in VA Medical Centers: Where Are They Today?, 9
BEHAV. THERAPIST 126 (1986); Kazdin & Bootzin, The Token Economy: An Evaluative
Review, 5 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 343 (1972); Lloyd & Abel, Performance on a Token
Economy Psychiatric Ward: A Two-Year Summary, 8 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 1 (1970);
Winkler, Management of Chronic Psychiatric Patients by a Token Reinforcement System, 3 J.
APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 47 (1970).
28. A survey conducted in the mid-1970's revealed that fourteen states utilized token
economy systems in their prisons. See Blatte, State Prisons and the Use of Behavior Control, 4
HASTINGS CENTER REP. II (Sept. 1974). See also, eg., M. MILAN, L. WOOD, R. WILLIAMS,
J. ROGERS, L. HAMPTON & J. MCGEE, APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND THE IMPRISONED
ADULT FELON PROJECT I: THE CELLBLOCK TOKEN ECONOMY (1974); Geller, Johnson,
Hamlin & Kennedy, Behavior Modification in a Prison, 4 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 11 (1977);
Milan & McKee, The Cellblock Token Economy: Token Reinforcement Procedures in a
Maximum Security Correctional Institution for Adult Male Felons, 9 J. APPLIED BEHAV.
ANALYSIS 253 (1976); Petrock & Walter, Behavior Modification in Corrections: Implications
for Organizational Change, 1 NEw ENG. J. PRISON L. 203 (1975).
29. Achievement Place, a community-based residential treatment home established in
1967 in Lawrence, Kansas for court-remanded delinquent and pre-delinquent youths, uses a
variety of behavior modification procedures, including a token economy, positive
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retarded, hyperactive, and emotionally disturbed children. 0 Their
use, which burgeoned in the 1970's, more recently has diminished
somewhat.
In addition to the token economy and the tier system, other
treatment techniques using positive reinforcement include shaping,31
reinforcement, and fines for inappropriate behavior. See Phillips, Achievement Place: Token
Reinforcement Procedures in a Home-Style Rehabilitation Setting for "Pre-Delinquent" Boys, 1
J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 213 (1968); Phillips, Phillips, Fixsen & Wolf, Achievement
Place: Behavior Shaping Works for Delinquents, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 75 (June 1973);
Phillips, Phillips, Fixsen & Wolf, Achievement Place: Modification of the Behaviors of Pre-
Delinquent Boys Within a Token Economy, 4 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 45 (1971). The
Achievement Place Model for delinquency treatment has been copied widely, and many such
homes are now in operation. NIMH BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 12;
see also, e.g., Denkowski & Denkowski, Community-Based Residential Treatment of the
Mentally Retarded Adolescent Offender: Phase 1, Reduction of Aggressive Behavior, 13 J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY 299 (1985); Liberman, Ferris, Salgado & Salgado, Replication of
the Achievement Place Model in California, 8 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 287 (1975). For a
comprehensive handbook outlining the procedures used at Achievement Place, see E.
PHILLIPS, E. PHILLIPS, D. FIXEN & M. WOLF, THE TEACHING FAMILY HANDBOOK (1972).
The Federal Bureau of Prisons has utilized token economies in the treatment of
delinquents at the National Training Center for Boys in Washington, D.C., and the Robert F.
Kennedy Youth Center in Morgantown, West Virginia. See Carlson, supra note 26, at 158-59.
For the description of a token economy system used in a California juvenile detention facility,
see Gambrill, The Use of Behavioral Methods in a Short-Term Detention Setting, 3 CRIM. JUST.
& BEHAV. 53 (1976); and Hobbs & Holt, The Effects of Token Reinforcement on the Behavior
of Delinquents in Cottage Settings, 9 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 189 (1976).
30. E.g., Birnbrauer, Wolf, Kidder & Tague, Classroom Behavior of Retarded Pupils with
Token Reinforcement, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 219 (1965); Broden, Hall,
Dunlap & Clark, Effects of Teacher Attention and a Token Reinforcement System in a Junior
High School Special Education Class, 36 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 341 (1970); Klotz,
Development of a Behavior Management Level System: A Comprehensive School- Wide Behavior
Management Program for Emotionally Disturbed Adolescents, 31 POINTER 5 (1987); O'Leary,
Becker, Evans & Sandargas, A Token Reinforcement Program in a Public School: A
Replication and Systematic Analysis, 2 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 277 (1969); O'Leary &
Drabman, Token Reinforcement Programs in the Classroom, 75 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 379
(1971).
31. In shaping,
a desired behavior is broken down into successive steps that are taught one by
one. Each of the steps is reinforced until it is mastered, and then the individual is
moved to the next one. In this way, the new behavior is gradually learned as
what the individual does becomes a closer and closer approximation of the
behavioral goal.
NIMH BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 6; see also A. BANDURA, supra
note 2, at 232-34; Sidman, Operant Techniques, in EXPERIMENTAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 170, 173-74 (1962).
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modeling, 32 and contingency contracting.33 The last of these-contin-
gency contracting-is similar to the bet. In contingency contracting,
the therapist and client, usually working within the client's natural
environment, together choose the behavioral goals to be achieved and
the reinforcement or aversive consequence that the client will receive
upon their attainment or non-attainment. For example, a parent and
child might agree that it would be desirable for the child to clean his
room by putting away his toys in an appropriate place each evening.
The child might want his parents to permit him to engage in a favorite
activity. A contract of sorts is then entered into between the parent
and child. The parent agrees to allow the child to engage in the favor-
ite activity only after the child has put away his toys for a specified
number of days; the child agrees that if the goal is not achieved, he
will forego participation in the activity or suffer some other penalty.
Thus, the contingency contract involves an exchange. Each party
agrees both to change his own behavior and to provide reinforcement
for the changes to be made by the other. Contingency contracting has
been used in marriage counseling,34 family therapy, 3 and the treat-
32. Modeling involves observational learning in which a person who already knows how to
perform the behavior in question demonstrates it for an observer. See A. BANDURA, supra
note 2, at 118-216; A. BANDURA, PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELING: CONFLICTING THEORIES
(1971); A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 47-105; NIMH BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION REPORT,
supra note 2, at 6; T. ROSENTHAL & B. ZIMMERMAN, SOCIAL LEARNING AND COGNITION
(1978); Bandura, Social Learning Through Imitation, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON
MOTIVATION 211-69 (M. Jones ed. 1962); Bandura, The Role of Imitation in Personality
Development, 18 J. NURSERY EDUC. 207 (1963); Zimmerman & Rosenthal, Observational
Learning of Rule Governed Behavior by Children, 81 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 29 (1974). For a
social cognitive account of modeling, see A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 72-78. Modeling
increasingly is being used in treatment. See S. RACHMAN & R. HODGSON, OBSESSIONS AND
COMPULSIONS (1980); RESEARCH IN THE SERVICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 4, at
328; Bandura, Jeffrey & Wright, Efficacy of Participant Modeling Function of Response
Induction Aids, 83 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 56 (1974); Nathan, supra note 2, at 397. For a
review of recent research on modeling with children, see Schunk, Peer Models and Children's
Behavioral Change, 57 REV. EDUC. RES. 149 (1987).
33. See D. MEICHENBAUM & D. TURK, FACILITATING TREATMENT ADHERENCE 164-84
(1987); NIMH BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 6; D. O'BANION & D.
WHALEY, BEHAVIORAL CONTRACTING: ARRANGING CONTINGENCIES OF REINFORCEMENT
(1981); Brady, supra note 2, at 2149-50; Kirschenbaum & Flanery, Toward a Psychology of
Behavioral Contracting, 4 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REV. 597 (1984).
34. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 2, at 2149-50.
35. See, e.g., Stuart, Behavioral Contracting Within the Families of Delinquents, 2 J.
BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 1 (1971).
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ment of obesity,36 smoking,37 alcoholism, 3 drug abuse, 39 and juvenile
delinquency.' A recent application in the prison context is "contract
parole.9
41
The other major category of behavior therapy implicated by the
bet is aversion therapy. Based on both classical and operant condi-
tioning, aversion therapy consists of "an attempt to associate an unde-
sirable behavior pattern with unpleasant stimulation or [to] make the
unpleasant stimulation a consequence of the undesirable behavior.
4
1
By applying negative consequences on the occurrence of inappropri-
ate or maladaptive behavior, aversion therapy seeks to establish a con-
nection between the target behavior and the unpleasant consequence
to induce avoidance or suppression of the target behavior. Aversive
consequences used have ranged from frowning, disapproval, criticism,
and scolding, to removal of privileges, total withholding of reinforce-
ment, social isolation ("time out"), fines, over-correction, slapping,
high-intensity auditory signals, lemon juice squirted into the mouth,
36. See, e.g., Fremouw, Callahan, Zitter & Katell, Stimulus Control and Contingency
Contracting for Behavior Change and Weight Loss, 6 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 289 (1981); Mann,
The Behavior-Therapeutic Use of Contingency Contracting to Control an Adult Behavior
Problem Weight Control, 5 J. APPLIED BEHAN. ANALYSIS 99 (1972); Romanczyk, Tracey,
Wilson & Thorpe, Behavioral Techniques in the Treatment of Obesity: A Comparative Analysis,
11 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 629 (1973); Stuart, Behaviorial Control of Overeating, 5 BEHAV.
RES. & THERAPY 357 (1967).
37. See, e.g., Tighe & Elliott, A Technique for Controlling Behavior in Natural Life
Settings, 1 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 263 (1968); Tooley & Pratt, An Experimental
Procedure for the Extinction of Smoking Behavior, 17 PSYCHOLOGICAL REc. 209 (1967).
38. See, e.g., Miller, The Use of Behavioral Contracting in the Treatment of Alcoholism, 3
BEHAV. THERAPY 593 (1972); Miller, Hersen & Eisler, Relative Effectiveness of Instructions,
Agreements and Reinforcement in Behavioral Contracts with Alcoholics, 83 J. ABNORM.
PSYCHOLOGY 548 (1974).
39. See, e.g., Beatty, Contingency Contracting with Heroin Addicts, 13 INT'L J.
ADDICTIONS 509 (1978); Boudin, Contingency Contracting as a Therapeutic Tool in the
Deceleration of Amphetamine Use, 3 BEHAV. THERAPY 604 (1972); Dolan, Black, Penk,
Robinowitz & DeFord, Predicting the Outcome of Contingency Contracting for Drug Abuse, 17
BEHAV. THERAPY 470 (1986); Magura, Casriel, Goldsmith, Strug & Lipton, Contingency
Contracting with Polydrug-Abusing Methadone Patients, 13 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 113 (1988).
40. See, e.g., Alexander & Parsons, Short-Term Behavioral Intervention with Delinquent
Families, 81 J. ABNORM. PSYCHOLOGY 219 (1973); Stuart, supra note 35; Weathers &
Liberman, Contingency Contracting with Families of Delinquent Adolescents, 6 BEHAV.
THERAPY 356 (1975).
41. Finckenauer & Rauh, Contract Parole: Some Legal and Rehabilitative Issues of
Mutual Agreement Programing for Parole Release, 5 CAP. U.L. REV. 175 (1976).
42. S. RACHMAN & J. TEASDALE, AVERSION THERAPY AND BEHAVIOR DISORDERS xii
(1969). For the distinction between aversive control, an operant term, and aversive
conditioning, a classical term, see Goldiamond, supra note 2, at 110 n.20. Although the
penalty provided in the wager discussed here is a mode of operant conditioning, making the
term "aversive control" the correct one, I find this term somewhat misleading. Because
"aversive control" is a form of conditioning, I will use the term "aversive conditioning"
interchangeably with "aversive control" and "aversion therapy."
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low-level electric shock, emetic drugs, and drugs inducing respiratory
paralysis.43 Aversive methods have been used in the treatment of
alcoholism, drug addiction, excessive smoking, compulsive eating,
sexual deviation, compulsive shoplifting, and such self-injurious
behavior in autistic children as head-banging, tongue-biting, and
rumination. They also have been used to alter disruptive and anti-
social behavior in school children, mental patients, the mentally
retarded, and prisoners."
These two techniques of behavior therapy-positive reinforce-
ment and aversive conditioning-are rooted in the basic behavioral
paradigm developed by Watson, Thorndike, and Skinner. Under the
traditional view, all behavior, even complex behavior, is a function of
its consequences and can be explained exclusively in terms of stimulus
and response. All behavior, in this view, is shaped by the environ-
mental stimuli that follow it in a more or less mechanical fashion;
indeed, a strict Skinnerian would regard it as unnecessary and mis-
leading to consider the role of the "will" or the "mind" in explaining
how organisms learn.45 However, this mechanical and deterministic
43. See NIMH BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-8; S. RACHMAN &
J. TEASDALE, supra note 42, at 8-13.
44. See generally A. BANDURA, supra note 2, at 501-63; NIMH BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-8; S. RACHMAN & J. TEASDALE, supra note 42;
Ayllon, supra note 3, at 7-8; Bucher & Lovaas, Use of Aversive Stimulation in Behavior
Modification, in MIAMI SYMPOSIUM ON THE PREDICTION OF BEHAVIOR, 1967: AVERSIVE
STIMULATION 77-145 (M. Jones ed. 1968); Schwitzgebel, Limitations on the Coercive
Treatment of Offenders, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 267, 277-87 (1972). For clinical applications, see,
e.g., Azrin & Wesolowski, Theft Reversal: An Overcorrection Procedure for Eliminating
Stealing by Retarded Persons, 7 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 577 (1974); Barber &
Winefield, The Influence of Stimulus Intensity and Motivational Differences on Learned
Helplessness Deficits, 8 PERS. & INDIVID. DIFFERENCES 25 (1987); Blatte, supra note 28, at 11
(reporting the use of aversion therapy in seven state prison systems); Feingold, An Automated
Technique for Aversive Conditioning in Sexual Deviations, in PSYCHOTECHNOLOGY:
ELECTRONIC CONTROL OF MIND AND BEHAVIOR 123 (1973); Foreyt & Kennedy, Treatment
of Overweight by Aversion Therapy, 9 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 29 (1971); Hallam &
Rachman, Some Effects of Aversion Therapy on Patients with Sexual Disorders, 10 BEHAV.
RES. & THERAPY 171 (1972); Holzinger, Mortimer & Van Dusen, Aversive Conditioning
Treatment of Alcoholism, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 450 (1967); Kellam, Shoplifting Treated by
Aversion to a Film, 7 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 125 (1969); Lovaas, Schaeffer & Simmons,
Building Social Behavior in Autistic Children by Use of Electric Shock, I J. EXPERIMENTAL
RES. PERSONALITY 99 (1965); Lovibond, Aversion Therapy for Heroin Dependence, 2 LANCET
382 (1968); Marks & Gelder, Transvestism and Fetishism: Clinical and Psychological Changes
During Faradic Aversion, 119 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 711 (1967); Tyler & Brown, The Use of
Swift Brief Isolation as a Group Control Devise for Institutionalized Delinquents, 5 BEHAV.
RES. & THERAPY 1 (1967); and Wallace, Burger, Neal, Brero & Davis, Aversive Conditioning
Use in Public Facilities for the Mentally Retarded, 14 MENTAL RETARDATION 17 (1976)
(aversive conditioning used in 45% of public residential facilities for the mentally retarded
responding to a survey).
45. See, e.g., B.F. SKINNER, ABoUr BEHAVIORISM 53-62, 152-70 (1974); B.F. SKINNER,
BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 184-86 (1971); B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN
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view of behavior is oversimplified and artificial. Surely more than
mechanical responses to external stimuli seem to be involved when we
engage in such diverse activities as learning arithmetic or psychology,
or how to ski, play poker, bake a cake, or build a bookcase.
B. The Wager as an Application of Principles of Cognitive and
Social Psychology
Cognitive and perceptual processes play an undeniable role in
virtually all of human learning. The traditional behavioral model of
learning accordingly has been challenged by what has come to be
known as cognitive psychology. According to cognitive theory, learn-
ing often involves cognitive or intellectual processes that cannot be
accounted for within the traditional behavioral paradigm.4 The work
BEHAVIOR 87-90, 110-16, 228-29 (1953); Ferster, supra note 16, at 107 (Watson regarded
thinking as the product of muscle activity). Although behaviorists do not deny the existence of
mental events, for example, the imagining of feared stimuli in systematic desensitization,
traditional behaviorists reject the notion that mental events cause behavior. See Ledwidge,
Cognitive Behavior Modification: A Step in the Wrong Direction?, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL.
353 (1978) (claiming that the study of mental events would threaten behaviorism's empirical
methods).
46. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 12-13, 115-22; H. GLErrMAN, supra note 10, at 90-
101; Breger & McGaugh, Critique and Reformulation of "Learning Theory" Approaches to
Psychotherapy and Neurosis, 63 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 338 (1965).
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of Wolfgang Kohler,47 Edward Tolman,48 Harry Harlow,49 and other
47. See W. KOHLER, THE MENTALITY OF APES (1925). Kohler devised an experiment in
which he placed chimpanzes in an enclosed play area. Kohler then placed fruit, usually
bananas, beyond the chimpanzees' reach, requiring them to use some nearby object as a tool to
obtain the fruit. Id. at 32-68. The chimpanzees learned to use sticks as rakes to haul in
bananas that were on the ground outside of the cage, and to club down fruit hung overhead
and beyond their grasp. Id Some chimpanzees learned to use the sticks as poles that they
would climb to retrieve the fruit before the sticks toppled over. Id. at 71-73. They also used
boxes as footstools and make-shift ladders. They eventually became builders, piling boxes on
top of one another to erect platforms from which they could jump to reach the fruit. Id. at
139-78. Sometimes the chimpanzees became toolmakers, breaking off branches from nearby
trees to use as sticks. One of the chimpanzees (the famous Sultan) learned to attach two
bamboo sticks together in order to create a rake long enough to reach fruit that was
particularly far away. Id. at 136-37.
To Kohler, the chimpanzees' behavior could not be explained merely in simple stimulus-
response terms. Rather, Kohler posited that the chimpanzees had behaved as if they had
obtained some insight into the problem and how to solve it. Id. at 276-77. Often the insightful
solution followed a period in which the chimpanzee paused, only moving its head and eyes as if
studying the situation. Once the problem was solved, the chimpanzees abandoned their past
unsuccessful strategies in favor of the new solution, which was then applied continuously
thereafter without the repetition of past errors. Id. at 179-234.
Kohler also demonstrated that the chimpanzees could transfer their new insights from the
original task to solve a new problem. For example, he selected chimpanzees that previously
had learned to use boxes as a platform to reach highly hung fruit. These chimpanzees again
were presented with highly hung fruit, but all boxes had been removed from the enclosure. Id.
at 48-49. They quickly found other objects, such as a table, which they dragged to place under
the fruit, and used them, as they previously had used the boxes, as a platform from which to
jump to retrieve the fruit. Id. In one case, the indomitable Sultan approached Kohler, pulled
him by the arm until he was under the fruit, and climbed upon him to reach the bananas. Id.
at 50. According to Kohler, the chimpanzees had acquired a new set of internal
"representations" of the situation based on knowledge of relationships and expectations
concerning the consequences of various actions. They reorganized their perceptions of the
situation and acquired general insights that could be adapted and transferred to other
situations. Id. at 179-234.
48. See E. TOLMAN, PURPOSIVE BEHAVIOR IN ANIMALS AND MEN (1932); Tolman, A
Cognitive Motivation Theory, in THEORIES OF MOTIVATION IN LEARNING 61 (1964); Tolman,
Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men, 55 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 189 (1948); Tolman & Honzik,
Introduction and Removal of Reward, and Maze Performance in Rats, 4 U. CAL.
PUBLICATIONS PSYCHOLOGY 257 (1930). Tolman described instrumental learning as the
acquisition of bits of knowledge or cognitions that are organized for future use. He
demonstrated that animals can learn about the performance of a task without even doing it.
Rats were run through a maze without reinforcement for a period of ten days. When he finally
placed food in the goal box at the end of the maze, a rapid decline in errors followed. The rats
had acquired some knowledge concerning the maze during their prior unreinforced trials, and
they later demonstrated this latent learning when Tolman introduced the rewards. Tolman &
Honzik, supra, at 257. In Tolman's arresting metaphor, animals acquire a variety of
"cognitive maps" that subsequently are used in framing their behavioral responses. Tolman,
Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men, supra, at 193; see also E. TOLMAN, supra, at 12 ("cognitive
determinants"). Tolman posited that the rats' expectancies concerning what they would find
in the goal box were a major determinant of their behavior, and that learning generally
consisted of the development of expectations that behavior will produce certain outcomes,
which led to general strategies of response. E. TOLMAN, supra, at 364.
49. See Harlow, Learning Set and Error Factor Theory, in 2 PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY OF A
SCIENCE 492 (S. Koch ed. 1959); Harlow, The Formation of Learning Sets, 56 PSYCHOLOGY
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cognitivists, challenged the model of radical behaviorism by demon-
strating that such mental processes as insight, problem solving strate-
gies, latent learning, expectancies, "learning sets," "cognitive maps,"
and "cognitive structures" play an important role in learning.50
These cognitive processes bridge the gap between stimulus and
response and cannot be ignored in any satisfactory explanation of
learning and behavior.
These insights of cognitive psychology have led to a paradigm
REV. 51 (1949). Harlow demonstrated that rhesus monkeys employed a form of abstract
reasoning in solving a series of discrimination problems that he had developed for them.
Although the monkeys were slow at first, their performances improved over time, and after
several hundred discrimination problems, they solved each one efficiently. Harlow posited that
the monkeys had acquired a "learning set," a problem solving strategy that they were able to
apply to each new discrimination problem. They developed generalized approaches to the
tasks based on conceptual relationships, not merely perceptual ones.
50. Cognitive psychology can be placed within the broader framework of the emerging
field of cognitive science, which brings together knowledge of the mind and mental processes
drawn from a number of academic disciplines-linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, and
computer sciences, as well as psychology. See G. LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS
THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND xi (1987); N. STILLINGS, M.
FEINSTEIN, J. GARFIELD, E. RISSLAND, D. ROSENBAUM, S. WEISLER & L. BAKER-WARD,
COGNITIVE SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION (1987). This work has revealed much about the
role of such cognitive devices as conceptual categories, family resemblances, prototypes,
scripts, folk theories, idealized cognitive models, analogies, metaphors, metonymic models,
and strategies of inference in human reasoning and behavior. See generally COGNITION AND
CATEGORIZATION (E. Rosch & B. Lloyd eds. 1978); COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (J.
Carroll & J. Payne eds. 1976); M. JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF
MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman, P. Slovik & A. Tversky eds. 1982); G. LAKOFF,
supra; G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By (1980); R. NISBETr & L. ROSS,
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); R.
SCHANK & R. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS, AND UNDERSTANDING (1977); L.
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (1922); Brown, How Shall a Thing Be
Called?, 65 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 14 (1958); Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic
Categories, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: GENERAL 192 (1975); Rosch, Natural
Categories, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 328 (1973). For scholarship in law and cognitive
theory, see, e.g., Edwards & von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for the
Law, 59 CAL. L. REV. 225 (1986); Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987); Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987);
Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic
Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990); Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc. REV. 123 (1980-1981); Wexler & Schopp,
How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation:
Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 485 (1989); Winick, Competency to
Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15
(1991) [hereinafter Competency]; Winick, The Right to Refuse Treatment: A First Amendment
Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1989) (hereinafter Right to Refuse]; Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988); and
Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1989).
THE POWER OF THE BET
shift, a reconceptualization of the basic behavioral model." Behavior
is no longer thought of as being reflexively or mechanically condi-
tioned by environmental stimuli. 2 Rather than automatically
strengthening behavior without the conscious involvement of the indi-
vidual, reinforcement functions as an "informative and motivational
influence." '53  Conditioning, in short, is "cognitively mediated."54
Internal cognitive processes determine how an individual experiences
reinforcement-how he attends to, processes, and remembers it-and
ultimately, how it affects present and future conduct. By experiencing
reinforcement, individuals learn the instrumental or functional value
of their behavior, le., they learn to predict and to expect certain
things to happen if they behave in certain ways.55 Reinforcers thus
impart information, which serves as a guide for action.56 "Contrary
to the mechanistic metaphors" of traditional behaviorism, "outcomes
change behavior in humans through the intervening influence of
thought."" Consequences or reinforcers influence action as a result
of their incentive value to the individual.5" After an individual has
recognized the instrumental relation between his actions and antici-
pated benefits or detriments, contingent reinforcers may produce
behavior depending upon how he values the incentive or disincentive
and the behavior itself." The individual, under this account, is
viewed "as a gatherer, processor, and user of information rather than
51. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 12-15; H. GLEITMAN, supra note 10, at 90-101;
Bandura, Behavior Theory and the Models of Man, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 859 (1974);
Boneau, Paradigm Regained? Cognitive Behaviorism Restated, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 297
(1974); Mahoney, The Cognitive Sciences and Psychotherapy: Patterns in a Developing
Relationship, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL THERAPIES 357-60 (K. Dobson ed.
1988).
52. A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 13; Bandura, supra note 51, at 859 ("Contrary to
popular belief, the fabled reflexive conditioning in humans is largely a myth.").
53. A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 122; Bandura, supra note 51, at 860; see also H.
GLEITMAN, supra note 10, at 96.
54. Bandura, supra note 51, at 859; see also A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 13 ("thoughts
mediate the effects of outcomes"; outcomes are "cognitively processed").
55. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 13, 412-13; H. GLEITMAN, supra note 10, at 96; B.
ROTTER, SOCIAL LEARNING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1954); Bandura, supra note 51, at
859-60.
56. Bandura, supra note 51, at 860; see also A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 122 (It is
"more fitting to speak of guidance of behavior by anticipated incentives than reinforcement of
behavior by reinforcers.").
57. Bandura, supra note 51, at 860.
58. Id.
59. See H. GLEITMAN, supra note 10, at 96; B. ROTTER, supra note 55; Bandura, supra
note 51, at 860. This account is similar to that developed by a branch of organizational
psychology known as "instrumentality theory." See, e.g., F. LANDY & D. TRUMBO,
PSYCHOLOGY OF WORK BEHAVIOR 293-333 (1976); V. VROOM, WORK AND MOTIVATION
(1964); Galbraith & Cummings, An Empirical Investigation of the Motivational Determinants
of Task Performance: Interactive Effects Between Instrumentality- Valence and Motivation-
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as a simple reactor to external carrots, whips, and the stimuli associ-
ated with them."'
What emerges is a reconceptualization of behavioral theory that
does not reject the basic insights of classical and operant conditioning,
but builds upon them, recasting them to add the essential cognitive
dimension that the traditional theories had overlooked. The tech-
niques of behavior therapy discussed above, based on principles of
positive reinforcement and aversive conditioning, can best be analyzed
within the framework of this emerging reconceptualization of beha-
viorism. Rather than viewing these techniques exclusively within the
narrow stimulus-response paradigm of traditional behaviorism, their
functioning can be better understood by using the newer insights of
cognitive behaviorism.6' Cognitive psychology thus helps to explain
why many of the techniques of behavior therapy have been so effec-
tive, and is especially useful in understanding the psychological power
of the bet.
Let us examine the bet in light of these insights. As can be seen,
the bet combines principles of both positive reinforcement and aver-
Ability, 2 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 237 (1967); Peak, Attitude and
Motivation, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 149 (M. Jones ed. 1955).
60. Boneau, supra note 51, at 308; see also A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 13:
[M]ost external influences operate through cognitive processing. During
transactions with their environment, people are not merely emitting responses
and experiencing outcomes. They form beliefs from observed regularities about
the outcomes likely to result from actions in given situations and regulate their
behavior accordingly. Contrary to claims that behavior is controlled by its
immediate consequences, behavior is related to its outcomes at the level of
aggregate consequences, rather than immediate effects. . . . Response
consequences convey probabilistic information for forming expectancies about
how outcomes relate to actions, rather than stamp in responses.
61. See generally A. BANDURA, supra note 12; A. BECK, COGNITIVE THERAPY AND THE
EMOTIONAL DISORDERS (1976); A. BECK & G. EMERY, ANXIETY AND PHOBIAS: A
COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE (1985); COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS: THEORY,
RESEARCH, AND PROCEDURES (P. Kendall & S. Hollon eds. 1979); HANDBOOK OF
COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL THERAPIES (K. Dobson ed. 1988); A. LAZARUS, BEHAVIOR
THERAPY AND BEYOND (1971); M. MAHONEY, COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION
(1974); D. MEICHENBAUM, COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: AN INTEGRATIVE
APPROACH (1977); C. THORESEN & M. MAHONEY, BEHAVIORAL SELF-CONTROL (1974); D.
TURK, D. MEICHENBAUM & M. GENEST, PAIN AND BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE: A COGNITIVE
BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE (1983); Beck, Cognitive Therapy: Nature and Relation to Behavior
Therapy, 1 BEHAV. THERAPY 184 (1970); Boneau, supra note 51; Dember, Motivation and the
Cognitive Revolution, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 161 (1974); Ingram & Scott, Cognitive Behavior
Therapy, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 53; Kendall, Cognitive Processes
and Procedures in Behavior Therapy, in REVIEW OF BEHAVIOR THERAPY: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 114 (11th ed. 1987); Meichenbaum & Cameron, Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, in
CONTEMPORARY BEHAVIOR THERAPY, supra note 2, at 310. A journal devoted to the field,
COGNITIVE THERAPY AND RESEARCH, was founded in 1977 with Michael Mahoney, a
leading proponent, as editor.
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sive conditioning. The reinforcement involved in the bet is usually the
generalized reinforcer of the money that will be received upon com-
pletion of the goal that is the subject of the wager. The negative or
aversive consequence is usually the money that the bettor will lose if
the goal is not achieved-not merely the failure to realize the profit of
winning, but the loss of the amount he is required to deposit in order
to enter into the bet. In this respect, the bet is a very close relative of
a type of contingency contracting in which the contract provides for a
positive reinforcer upon completion of the goal, but requires applica-
tion of an aversive consequence or penalty should the goal not be
reached.62 Moreover, as with contingency contracting, the reinforcer
and aversive consequence used in the bet need not be limited to
money. Indeed, creative selection of reinforcers can result in much
more potent motivators than money. Behavior therapists often select
reinforcers pursuant to what is known as the "Premack Principle,
63
under which the incentive preferences of the particular patient as
revealed by his natural behavior are relied on in tailoring the thera-
peutic program to the individual whose behavior is sought to be
changed.6M Thus, a patient electing contingency contracting to deal
with a problem of obesity might agree to engage in a favorite activity,
say, watching Monday night football or going to the movies, only if
he accomplishes a specified weight loss in a particular time period,
and to deposit with his therapist a post-dated check for twenty-five
dollars made payable to an organization he despises, say, the Ameri-
can Nazi Party, that the therapist will mail to the organization if he
fails to meet the goal. Given the individual's preferences, the reward
of the football game or movie, or the sanction of the American Nazi
Party donation, will generate greater motivation for him to achieve
the goal than will obtaining or forfeiting a specified sum of money,
perhaps even if it were several hundred dollars. Tailoring the stakes
in the bet to the individual's incentive preferences can have similarly
beneficial effects. A ticket to a particular sporting event or rock con-
62. See supra notes 33.41 and accompanying text.
63. See Premack, supra note 23.
64. For discussions of creative reinforcement procedures, see D. MEICHENBAUM & D.
TURK, supra note 33, at 176-84; and Brady, supra note 2, at 2149; see also, e.g., Romancyzk,
Tracey, Wilson & Thorpe, supra note 36, at 630 (client's deposit in treatment program for
obesity made refundable contingent on attendance at treatment sessions); Hinds, Cutting the
Dropout Rate. High Goal But Low Hopes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1990, at 1, col. I (use by
school systems to decrease the school dropout rate of creative positive reinforcers, such as
pizza parties, summer jobs, and drawings for used cars, and of creative aversive conditioners
such as revocation of driver's license); infra note 126 (discussing the use of creative reinforcers
in contingency contracting programs to treat drug addiction); infra note 168 (discussing
creative use of non-monetary aversive consequences).
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cert might inspire superhuman efforts by a student in meeting particu-
lar goals-like improving school attendance or academic
performance-as opposed to a reward of fifty dollars. Conversely,
loss of the opportunity to attend a school basketball game or dance
might be a much more effective sanction for him than the loss of fifty
dollars.
Perhaps for some behavior patterns that are difficult to master,
or bad habits that are difficult to break, the bet can be structured to
provide partial rewards or sanctions, or points or tokens (later
redeemable when enough have been accumulated) periodically as
intermediate targets65 are either achieved or missed, measured at
intervals that occur frequently, thereby facilitating the progressive
shaping of behavior.66 Indeed, structuring the bet to allow for such
periodic rewards or sanctions would probably always be desirable
since the learning of adaptive behavior and the extinction of maladap-
tive behavior will more likely occur if the interval between such target
behavior and the provision of the reinforcer or aversive consequence
is brief.67 This is especially true for people with a diminished ability
to defer gratification. 6 For people with middle-class values or back-
grounds, who may have a strong ability to delay gratification,69 the
promise of a reward in the future may be sufficient to motivate present
behavior. Thus, middle-class students will work hard to achieve
future reinforcement in the form of good grades provided at the end
of a semester and increased educational and occupational opportuni-
ties that may come many years later. Others, however, including
many of the disadvantaged whose social or health problems govern-
ment is most interested in solving, often are more present-oriented,
valuing present utility and heavily discounting the future. For them,
65. Providing intermediate targets, or subgoals, will best maintain self-motivation over the
period of performance of the ultimate goal. A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 474-76. "Subgoals
provide present guides and inducements for action, while subgoal attainments produce the
efficacy, information and self-satisfactions that sustain one's efforts along the way. Persistence
that leads to eventual mastery of an activity is thus ensured through a progression of subgoals,
each with a high probability of success." Id. at 475.
66. See supra note 31.
67. See H. GLEITMAN, supra note 10, at 83; Perin, A Quantitative Investigation of the
Delay of Reinforcement Gradient, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 37 (1943). But see A.
BANDURA, supra note 12, at 15-16 (questioning the principle of immediacy of reinforcement,
and suggesting that individuals respond to reinforcers by cognitively integrating the timing and
frequency of reinforcement).
68. See Schneider & Lysgaard, The Deferred Gratification Pattern: A Preliminary Study,
18 AM. Soc. REV. 142 (1953).
69. The received wisdom that ability to defer gratification is class-based may not withstand
empirical examination. The inability to defer gratification may be pervasive in our society,
brought about by peer pressures and societal conditioning at all class levels. The question
deserves empirical investigation.
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the concept of future benefits may have little meaning and may not
effectively influence behavior.
The traditional bet-with payoff or payout occurring at the con-
clusion of a perhaps lengthy time period that marks the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of a particular contingency-may thus need restruc-
turing to be successfully adapted for governmental use in the areas
discussed here. Periodic provision of rewards or sanctions (or points
that accumulate toward such rewards or sanctions) as intermediate
goals are met or missed may function more effectively. Another alter-
native would be rewards or sanctions (or points) provided at variable,
but non-predictable, intervals following attainment or nonattainment
of an intermediate goal. Indeed, such variable rate reinforcement, the
principle upon which the slot machine is based, can serve as a power-
ful influencer of behavior.70
Aside from how the bet is structured, some people will be moti-
vated to succeed simply because they like game playing, especially
game playing where they have a stake in the outcome and a reason-
able prospect of winning. Games are fun, at least for many people,
and there often is a real pleasure in the competition and thrill in the
victory. People like to win, especially when their victory is a public
one; few like to lose a game, especially when their loss is public.
In addition to combining the two basic applications of learning
theory-positive reinforcement and aversive conditioning-to facili-
tate achievement of the goal, the bet provides a seductive motivator
that can function to induce people to commit themselves to the
accomplishment of a desirable goal who otherwise might not do so.
Many people know they should change their behavior patterns in cer-
tain respects, discontinuing a bad habit, for example, or initiating a
course of conduct that they have been contemplating. Although they
have reached this cognitive awareness, however, they prefer to defer
action until tomorrow, or next week, or next year. But tomorrow
never quite comes. If confronted, they frequently will affirm their
willingness to accomplish the goal in question, but for a variety of
reasons (or just because they aren't quite ready to start) temporizing
70. See H. GLErrMAN, supra note 10, at 86-88 (variable rate reinforcement schedules are
more effective than fixed rate schedules); Lewis & Duncan, Effect of Different Percentages of
Money Reward on Extinction of a Lever-Pulling Response, 52 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
23 (1956) (less frequent provision of reinforcement produces behavior that is less subject to
extinction than that produced by more frequent reinforcement); Yukl, Wexley & Seymore,
Effectiveness of Pay Incentives Under Variable Ratio and Continuous Reinforcement Schedules,
56 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 19, 22 (1972) (variable rate reinforcement schedules are more
effective than continuous rate schedules). Indeed, the schedule of reinforcement may have a
greater effect on response rate than the nature or size of the reinforcer. See generally C.
FERSTER & B.F. SKINNER, SCHEDULES OF REINFORCEMENT (1957).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
seems attractive. Some of these individuals might find the bet to be an
attractive spark to action, a needed inducement to get them moving.
An offer to bet, of course, will not convince people to do what they do
not wish to do. But for those who are flirting with the idea of under-
taking the achievement of a particular goal, or even for those who
haven't considered the goal, but who wish to obtain the monetary (or
non-monetary) reinforcer that comes with its achievement, the offer
to bet can have a powerful effect. Indeed, I suggest that if properly
employed, an offer by government to wager with its citizens about the
outcome of contingencies within their control can have a far more
powerful effect than when the government merely challenges them to
behave in a particular way, or exhorts them to do so, or even when it
threatens them with sanctions for non-compliance.
The threat of sanctions often will fail effectively to bring about
behavior change when sanctions are rarely or randomly imposed.71
Indeed, the credibility of the threat is seriously diminished when the
level of detection is as low as finite enforcement resources will inevita-
bly dictate. The criminal sanction and the civil fine are good exam-
ples; they simply have not effectively deterred many kinds of socially
harmful behavior. For example, the threat of sanctions has not suc-
ceeded in effectively changing the behavior of drug abusers, intoxi-
cated drivers, or environmental polluters. In frustration, the public
demands harsher penalties, but without a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty in their application, the threat of even severe sanctions will
have little effect if the environment continues to reward the behavior
that is sought to be deterred.72
71. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 273, 278, 281; J. GIBB, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND
DETERRENCE 60, 105-10 (1975); R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 164-65; Andeneas, The General
Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 960-70 (1966); Antunes & Hunt,
The Impact of Certainty and Severity of Punishment on Levels of Crime in American States, 64
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 486, 492-93 (1973); Erickson, Gibbs & Jensen, The Deterrence
Doctrine and the Perceived Certainty of Legal Punishments, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 305 (1977);
Nagel, Trade Offs in Crime Reduction Among Certainty, Severity, and Crime Benefits, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 100, 108-14 (1982); Tittle & Rowe, Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates: A
Further Test of the Deterrence Hypothesis, 52 Soc. FORCES 455 (1974). For extensive
treatments of deterrence theory, see, e.g., G. BECKER & W. LANDES, ESSAYS ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1974); DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION:
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (A. Blumstein, J.
Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978); M. SILVER, PUNISHMENT, DETERRENCE AND POLICE
EFFECTIVENESS: A SURVEY AND CRITICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RECENT
ECONOMETRIC LITERATURE (1974); C. TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE: THE
QUESTION OF DETERRENCE (1980); and F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).
72. See, e.g., A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 279; J. WILSON & J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME
AND HUMAN NATURE 398, 401 (1985); Antunes & Hunt, supra note 71, at 492-93. I do not
suggest that the criminal sanction, because of the uncertainty of its application, has no
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With the bet, on the other hand, there is certainty: The individ-
ual will either behave in the targeted way and collect an agreed-upon
reward, or fail to do so and suffer an agreed-upon sanction. The exact
amount or nature of the reward and sanction are known in advance,
and one or the other will occur with certainty within a specified
period of time. The rules of the game are known by the players and
accepted by them in advance; indeed, those opting to participate have
a strong incentive to master the rules. Target behaviors are objecti-
fied, measurable, and well understood by all, as are the means of
determining winners and losers.
The setting of explicit goals is itself a significant factor in their
achievement." This "goal-setting effect," "one of the most robust
findings in the psychological literature," '74 helps to explain why people
function differently with regard to successful completion of perform-
ance when they have bet that they will perform in a certain way than
when they have not. The conscious setting of a goal is virtually indis-
pensable to its achievement." Moreover, by entering into a wager,
the individual is predicting that he can achieve the goal and that he
will do so, thereby setting up expectancies that help to insure suc-
cess.76 Goals enhance motivation and increase effort through self-
deterrent effect. I merely suggest that, in the case of at least some socially harmful behavior, it
is not as effective a deterrent as we would like. Even though imperfect, I have no doubt that
the criminal sanction plays an important deterrent role generally, and that were criminal
penalties abolished for at least certain antisocial conduct, such conduct would increase, in
some cases dramatically. Moreover, in addition to its deterrent effect, the criminal law has an
important socializing effect, serving an educative or moralizing function. See, e.g., J. GIBB,
supra note 71, at 68-71; Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality, 43 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 176, 179-80 (1952). When the criminal sanction has not
succeeded in deterring particular kinds of socially harmful behavior as much as we would like,
we need to devise new approaches to supplement the criminal sanction. Since fiscal and social
costs of increasing law enforcement to levels sufficient to effectively deter such behavior are
higher than we are willing or able to bear, we should consider supplemental approaches, like
the governmental wager proposed here.
73. See Campbell, The Effects of Goal-Contingent Payment on the Performance of a
Complex Task, 37 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 23 (1984); Huber, Comparison of Monetary
Reinforcers and Goal Setting as Learning Incentives, 56 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 223 (1985);
Kirschenbaum & Flanery, supra note 33; Locke, Shaw, Saari & Latham, Goal Setting and Task
Performance: 1969-1980, 90 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 125 (1981); Terborg & Miller,
Motivation, Behavior, and Performance: A Closer Examination of Goal Setting and Monetary
Incentives, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 29 (1978).
74. Campbell, supra note 73, at 23; see also Locke, Shaw, Saari & Latham, supra note 73.
75. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 469 ("Those who set no goals achieve no change
. . . .11).
76. Id. at 412-13, 467. Predictions and expectations concerning goal achievement
stimulate feelings of self-efficacy, which themselves spark action and effort. See Id. at 413; cf.
Rotter, Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement, 80
PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 1 (1966) (behavior varies with the individual's generalized
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monitoring, self-evaluative, and self-reactive processes." They "serve
to structure and guide human endeavors" over the often long period
of performance. 7' Goals provide direction and focus interest, atten-
tion, and personal involvement.79 The "goal-setting effect" explains
why people who have bet they will perform a task try harder and
don't give up as easily when success appears difficult or far off."0 By
entering into a wagering agreement or contingency contract with the
government, which reduces the goal to writing, the individual has
made the goal concrete, undeniable, and harder to renounce.8'
Not only does the governmental wager make the goal explicit,
but it explicitly ties the payoff to its achievement. When reinforce-
ment is offered contingent on the achievement of specific goals, such
as when employees are paid on a piece-rate basis, research has demon-
strated that performance is significantly higher than when reinforce-
ment is provided non-contingently, such as when employees are paid
on an hourly or weekly basis.8 2 By making explicit both the goal and
the reward that will be received if it is achieved, or the sanction that
will be applied if it is not, the bet allows the individual to understand
the instrumental value of his behavior and therefore to take full
advantage of the motivating influence that the reinforcement pro-
vides. Thus, in line with the cognitive reconceptualization of beha-
viorism, the bet functions to enhance the power of the reinforcement
involved to act as both an informative and motivating influence spark-
ing behavior.
In addition, the external reinforcement received under the wager
is not the only and not necessarily the most important behavioral
influence that the bet provides. By making self-satisfaction contingent
on goal performance, the wager engages a number of important
expectancies that outcomes are determined by his own actions or by external forces beyond his
control).
77. A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 469-72.
78. Id. at 469.
79. Id. at 472.
80. Id. at 469-70.
81. Id. at 472 ("The degree to which goals create incentives and guides for action is partly
determined by their specificity.").
82. E.g., Berger, Cummings & Heneman, Expectancy Theory and Operant Conditioning
Predictions of Performance Under Variable Ratio and Continuous Schedules of Reinforcement,
14 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 227 (1975); Huber, supra note 73, at
223-24, 234; Terborg & Miller, supra note 73, at 31; Yukl, Wexley & Seymore, supra note 70.
One exception to this general effect may be creative behavior. See Amabile, Hennessey &
Grossman, Social Influences on Creativity: The Effects of Contracted-for Reward, 50 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 14 (1986). This point is well understood by the
MacArthur Foundation, which grants its famous "genius" award, consisting of a generous,
non-contingent stipend, to people of exceptional promise to support whatever work that they
might like to pursue with the time freed by the award.
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intrinsic sources of motivation. 3 The wager channels performance
and activates self-monitoring and self-evaluative mechanisms that
facilitate goal achievement and attitude change. Even apart from
receiving the extrinsic reward, winning the bet produces a measure of
internal satisfaction that is self-reinforcing. Because the individual
voluntarily decides to enter into the governmental wager, the bet itself
constitutes an internalizing of the external goal. 4 Achieving an inter-
nalized goal brings personal satisfaction and enhances self-esteem and
feelings of self-efficacy. Anticipating these intensely positive feelings
inspires greater effort to meet the goal. Failure to achieve an internal-
ized goal, on the other hand, produces dissatisfaction and reduces
self-esteem. The feelings produced by the anticipation of failure to
meet an internalized goal are so strongly unpleasant that people inevi-
tably act to reduce them, by intensifying their efforts in order to avoid
such failure, or conversely, by abandoning the goal itself and disasso-
ciating from the experience of having set it.8" The psychological
processes involved can be explained in terms of what Leon Festinger
described as "cognitive dissonance," the tendency of individuals to
reinterpret information or experience that conflicts with their inter-
nally accepted or publicly stated beliefs in order to avoid the unpleas-
ant personal state that such inconsistencies produce. 86 This
phenomenon affects not only perception, but behavior as well, causing
the individual to mobilize his energies and resources in furtherance of
the goal in order to avoid the dissonance that failure to achieve it
would create.
The individual's anticipated internal reactions to success or fail-
ure are thus self-reinforcing in ways that augment the motivating
effects of the bet's extrinsic rewards and sanctions. Moreover, these
external behavioral influencers will reduce the tendency of people
encountering difficulty simply to abandon the goal in order to avoid
the internal disappointment of failure. The internal self-reinforcing
effects of the bet are enhanced when it is ceremoniously entered into,
as by the formal execution of a written contingency contract contain-
ing a pledge of performance.87 For similar reasons, these effects are
enhanced when the internalized goal is publicly communicated to
83. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 467, 471-72. See generally E. DECI, INTRINSIC
MOTIVATION (1975).
84. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 477-78.
85. See id. at 469-70.
86. See generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); L.
FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE (1964). For a review of empirical
studies on cognitive dissonance, see J. BREHM & A. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE (1962).
87. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 477-78; D. MEICHENBAUM & D. TURK, supra
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others whose esteem and respect the individual values."8 Thus, a bet
publicly made has a greater chance of success. The anticipated praise
and respect that family, friends, and peer group members will provide
if the goal is achieved serve as additional positive reinforcement; their
anticipated disappointment, and perhaps ridicule if the goal is not
achieved, serve as additional motivation to perform. For most people,
failure to achieve an internalized and publicly assumed goal is
extremely embarrassing, producing feelings of defeat and shame. The
individual feels that he has let himself down, as well as others who
believed in him. It is a blow to his ego and to his standing in whatever
community is important to him. Avoidance of such public embarrass-
ment will provide strong motivation to succeed, at least for most peo-
ple. The self-evaluative and self-reinforcing aspects of the bet can
thus be enhanced if the governmental wager is ceremonialized by the
official signing of the wagering agreement and its public
announcement. 89
The offer to wager also harnesses the power of individual choice.
Many people do not respond well when told what to do. Unless they
themselves see merit in achieving the goal, sometimes even when the
costs of non-compliance are high, they may well resent pressure
imposed by others and refuse to comply, or act perversely in ways
note 33, at 170, 173-76. See generally C. KIESLER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMITMENT:
EXPERIMENTS LINKING BEHAVIOR TO BELIEF (1971).
88. See D. MEICHENBAUM & D. TURK, supra note 33, at 170, 174.
89. When an individual's behavior is public, rather than purely private, social
psychological influences have a significant impact on his self-conception, and as a consequence,
on his future behavior. See generally E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN
EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); R. PETTY & J. CACIOPPO, ATTITUDES & PERSUASION: CLASSIC
AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 152-55 (1981); PUBLIC SELF AND PRIVATE SELF (R.
Baumeister ed. 1986). Public behavior invites feedback from others in the form of approval or
disapproval, which provides a "social mirror" by which the individual constructs and adjusts
his sense of identity. Tedeschi, Private and Public Experiences and the Self, in PUBLIC SELF
AND PRIVATE SELF, supra, at 1, 4-5. Publicly exhibited behavior has a potentially greater
effect on the individual's future behavior than private behavior, which is easy for the individual
to dismiss, distort, or forget. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 478; Hovland, Campbell &
Brock, The Effects of "Commitment" on Opinion Change Following Communication, in THE
ORDER OF PRESENTATION IN PERSUASION 23 (C. Hovland ed. 1957); Schlenker, Self-
Identification: Toward an Integration of the Private and Public Self, in PUBLIC SELF AND
PRIVATE SELF, supra, at 21, 26-27. Hence, the goal setting effect, see supra notes 73-81 and
accompanying text, the individual's commitment to attain a goal he has adopted, and the
impact of cognitive dissonance on goal achievement, see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying
text, are all further enhanced when he has publicly set the goal. See A. BANDURA, supra note
12, at 478; C. KiESLER, supra note 87, at 16; D. MEICHENBAUM & D. TURK, supra note 33, at
174; Hovland, Campbell & Brock, supra, at 31-32. These effects of the public commitment to a
goal are even further augmented when the individual's commitment is communicated to those
whose esteem and respect the individual values. See D. MEICHENBAUM & D. TURK, supra
note 33, at 170; Schlenker, supra, at 28-29.
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calculated to frustrate achievement of the goal. By contrast, the offer
to wager can be accepted or rejected. The choice is up to the individ-
ual. The law strongly favors allowing such choice, rather than
attempting to achieve public or private goals through compulsion.9
90. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[O]ur notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea
of physical freedom and self-determination .. "); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-34
(1975) ("IT]hose who wrote the Bill of Rights... understood the inestimable worth of free
choice."); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("This Court has
long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) ("the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our political system rests"). Respect for individual choice is deeply rooted in American
constitutional history and tradition, which were heavily influenced by Enlightenment notions
of popular sovereignty and limited government. See generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS (1942); Smith, The
Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175 (1982). When Jefferson, author of the
Declaration of Independence, emphasized the right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness" among those "unalienable rights" with which all men are endowed, he referred to a
right that the individual had against the government to pursue his own ends in his own ways.
This was the ideal that Jefferson reiterated in his First Inaugural Address, calling for "a wise
and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, [but] shall leave
them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement ... .
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 13, 15 (1965) (First
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801). To secure this right of personal autonomy, among other
"blessings of liberty," the colonists ordained and established the Constitution. U.S. CONST.
preamble.
Indeed, respect for individual autonomy is a central principle of much of our ethical and
political theory, traceable to two major ethical traditions in modern Western philosophy-
consequentialist theories, such as the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill,
and deontological theories, such as those of Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. See J.
BENTHAM, supra note 15; J. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (J.
Beck trans. 1949); J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (C. Shields ed. 1956); and J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971); see also J. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (1986); J. FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE,
AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 110-29 (1980); Dworkin,
Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971); and Morris,
Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (1968).
This principle of autonomy permeates much of American law. See, e.g., Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406-07, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960) ("Anglo-American law starts with
the premise of thorough-going self-determination."). For example, it forms a basic premise of
our systems of civil and criminal procedure. See R. COVER, 0. FiSS & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE
1571-72 (1988) (Civil and criminal procedure are "premised upon litigant autonomy."). It also
informs much of private law. See, e.g., H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE
CONTRACT 30-31 (1961):
[Tihe nature of command... is vastly different from the nature of contract....
The action desired in the one case is brought about by instilling fear, in the other
by offering hope. Command threatens the donkey with the stick; contract
obtains his willing response by offering him a carrot. The person to whom the
command is issued has no choice but to obey; the person to whom an offer for a
contract is made may choose whether he will accept or reject. Command is
slavery; contract is freedom.
See also 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 2-3 (1981) (introductory note to ch. 8)
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Aside from the political values reflected in this preference, it is
strongly supported by utilitarian considerations. Cognitive and social
psychology explain why allowing choice enhances the potential for
success. People directed to perform a task do not feel personally com-
mitted to the goal or personally responsible for its fulfillment.9
Choice, on the other hand, brings a degree of commitment that mobi-
lizes the self-evaluative and self-reinforcing mechanisms that facilitate
goal achievement. 92  This explanation is supported by empirical
research in a variety of areas suggesting that allowing individuals to
exercise choice increases the likelihood of success. Research with
children, for example, has demonstrated that involving them in treat-
ment planning and decisionmaking leads to greater compliance and
increases the efficacy of treatment.93 Similarly, allowing students to
("The principle of freedom of contract is itself rooted in the notion that it is in the public
interest to recognize that individuals have broad powers to order their own affairs by making
legally enforceable promises."). In health law, an area closely related to many of the proposed
uses of governmental wagering, it serves as the basis for the central doctrine of informed con-
sent. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406-07, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985); Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.); P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ &
A. MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 22, 26-28
(1987); 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 2-4 (1982);
Appelbaum, Mirkin & Bateman, Empirical Assessment of Competency to Consent to Psychiatric
Hospitalization, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1170 (1981); Beauchamp, Paternalism and Biobehavi-
oral Control, 60 THE MONIST 62 (1977); Macklin & Sherwin, Experimenting on Human Sub-
jects: Philosophical Perspectives, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 434 (1975); Meisel, The
"Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values
in Medical Decision Making, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413, 441; Shultz, From Informed Consent to
Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985); Sprung & Winick,
Informed Consent in Theory and Practice: Legal and Medical Perspectives on the Informed
Consent Doctrine and a Proposed Reconceptualization, 17 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1346, 1346
(1989).
91. A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 338, 363, 368, 468-69, 470-71, 475-76, 478-79. This
feeling may apply even for tasks the individual is directed to perform in furtherance of his own
best interests. One example is medical treatment. When physicians do not allow patient
participation in treatment decisions and do not explain treatment to them, patients tend to fail
to comply with medical advice. See P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, supra note 90, at
28; Appelbaum & Gutheil, Drug Refusal. A Study of Psychiatric Inpatients, 137 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 340, 341 (1980); Shultz, supra note 90, at 293 & n.323. See generally D.
MEICHENBAUM & D. TURK, supra note 33.
92. A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 338, 363, 368, 468, 478-79.
93. See Lewis, Decision Making Related to Health, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO
CONSENT 75 (1981); Melton, Children's Competence to Consent, A Problem in Law and Social
Science, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, supra, at 1, 11; Melton, Children's
Participation in Treatment Planning: Psychological and Legal Issues, 12 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY
246, 250-51 (1981); Melton, Decision Making in Children: Psychological Risks and Benefits, in
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, supra, at 21, 30-31. Treatment adherence in general
has been shown to increase when the patient is given choice and participation in the selection
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make choices about educational programs causes them to work
"harder, faster, and [react] more positively to the situation than when
they [are] unable to make such choices." 94 It has also been suggested
that medical and mental health treatments are more effective when
provided on a voluntary, rather than involuntary, basis." Moreover,
having and making choices is developmentally beneficial. Except for
young children, and sometimes even including them, the more choice
we give individuals, the more they will act as mature, self-determining
adults. Treating individuals as adults able to make choices, rather
than as incompetent subjects of our paternalism, pity, or even con-
tempt, will have a therapeutic effect. Hopefully, these individuals will
come to view themselves as in control of their lives, rather than as
mere passive victims of forces they can neither understand nor con-
of treatment alternatives and goals. D. MEICHENBAUM & D. TURK, supra note 33, at 157,
159, 175; Kanfer & Gaelick, Self-Management Methods, in HELPING PEOPLE CHANGE 334
(1986).
94. Brigham, Some Effects of Choice on Academic Performance, in CHOICE AND
PERCEIVED CONTROL 131, 140 (1979); see also Amabile & Gitomer, Children's Artistic
Creativity: Effects of Choicefor Task Materials, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL.
209 (1984) (restriction of choice negatively affects creativity).
95. See P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, supra note 90, at 28; S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY
& B. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 178 & n.2, 181 n.34 (3d ed. 1985);
D. MEICHENBAUM & D. TURK, supra note 33, at 175; Appelbaum, Mirkin & Bateman, supra
note 90; Culver & Gert, The Morality of Involuntary Hospitalization, in THE LAW-MEDICINE
RELATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 159, 171 (1981); Freedberg & Johnston, Effects
of Various Sources of Coercion on Outcome of Treatment of Alcoholism, 43 PSYCHOLOGICAL
REP. 1271, 1277 (1978); Nicholson, Correlates of Commitment Status in Psychiatric Patients,
100 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 241, 244 (1986); Perlin & Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the
Representation of Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161,
190 (1982); Rogers & Webster, Assessing Treatability in Mentally Disordered Offenders, 13
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 20-21 (1989); Stein & Test, Alternative to Mental Hospital
Treatment, 37 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 392 (1980); Stromberg & Stone, A Model State
Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARV. J. LEGIS. 275, 327 (1983); Ward, Use
of Legal Coercion in the Treatment of Alcoholism: A Methodological Review, in ALCOHOLISM:
INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND TREATMENT 272 (D. Ward ed. 1980); Note, Developments
in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1399 (1974).
Professors Durham and La Fond's extensive review of the literature on the effectiveness of
psychotherapy and psychotropic medication, the two most prevalent forms of treatment for
the mentally ill, found no persuasive evidence that coercive application of these techniques to
involuntarily committed patients, as opposed to those seeking and receiving treatment in non-
hospital settings, was effective. Durham & La Fond, A Search for the Missing Premise of
Involuntary Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 40 RUTGERS L.
REV. 303 (1988); see Durham & La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy
Implications of Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 395 (1985) (analyzing adverse effects of a statutory broadening of civil commitment
standards); see also Washington v. Harper, I 10 S. Ct. 1028, 1051 n.15 (1990) ("The efficacy of
forced drugging is also marginal; involuntary patients have a poorer prognosis than
cooperating patients.") (Stevens, J., dissenting); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144
(D.N.J. 1978) ("[T]he testimony has indicated that involuntary treatment is much less effective
than the same treatment voluntarily received.").
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trol-a feeling that undoubtedly contributes to the existence and con-
tinuation of their social problems.
96
In this way, the governmental wager can be rehabilitative, func-
tioning as an instrument of social redemption. By activating the
power of individual choice and mobilizing the self-evaluative and self-
reinforcing mechanisms of intrinsic motivation, the wager has the
potential to initiate a course of conduct that the individual will con-
tinue even beyond the time when the extrinsic rewards of the wager
can be available. 97 The amount paid out by the government upon
successful performance of the goal can be seen not merely as a social
cost-an expenditure incurred to achieve a particular public goal-
but also as a capital investment in our socially disadvantaged that can
produce enormous future returns of individual and social utility.
Engaging the power of individual choice is thus an essential
ingredient of the wagering scheme proposed here. To succeed in acti-
vating the psychological benefits of choice, the wager must be offered
on a purely voluntary basis-without undue inducement or any ele-
ment of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or coercion. To the extent that
the individual perceives himself to be coerced into entering a wager
with the government, these benefits may be lost and the individual
may fail to meet the goal or may simply achieve it to obtain the
extrinsic reinforcement offered without having it stimulate intrinsic
96. The concept of "learned helplessness" seems useful in this connection. It posits that
repetitive events outside an individual's control may produce a generalized feeling of
ineffectiveness that debilitates performance and undermines motivation and feelings of self-
efficacy. See M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH
(1975); Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and
Reformulation, 87 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 49 (1978); Maier & Seligman, Learned
Helplessness: Theory and Evidence, 105 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 3 (1976); Thornton
& Jacobs, Learned Helplessness in Human Subjects, 87 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 367
(1971); see also Rotter, supra note 76 (viewing behavior as a function of individual expectancies
concerning whether outcomes are determined by his actions or by external forces beyond his
control). By contrast, when an individual exercises control and makes choices, he experiences
increased opportunities to build skills necessary for successful living. As a result he gradually
acquires feelings of self-efficacy, which in turn become important determinants of motivation
and performance. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 390-449.
97. Self-reinforcing contingencies, like the feeling of a job well done, have been shown to
continue the improved employee performance produced initially by a contingent reinforcement
program, even after the external incentives were withdrawn:
The injection of the contingent reinforcement may have been necessary to get the
salespersons' performance behavior tracking in the desired direction, but then
other existing, natural reinforcers (e.g., a supervisor's praise, positive customer
reactions, or even self-reinforcing contingencies such as the feeling of a job well
done) in the environment took over to maintain the behavior when the
intervention was withdrawn.
Luthans, Paul & Baker, An Experimental Analysis ofthe Impact of Contingent Reinforcement
on Salespersons' Performance Behavior, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 314, 319 (1981).
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motivation and without realizing any lasting effects. The individual's
perception of coercion or external control may be as detrimental as
coercion itself. For lasting behavior change to occur, the individual
must attribute his new behavior pattern to internal mechanisms; to
the extent that he attributes it to extrinsic forces, such as to obtain the
reward or avoid the penalty, attitude change will not occur.9" This
danger exists not only when the individual's decision to enter into the
wagering agreement is produced by outright coercion, but also when
the reward offered is so enticing (or penalty to be imposed so repel-
lent) that he feels compelled to participate and succeed. This phe-
nomenon is related to what has been termed the "overjustification
effect," 99 which predicts that the use of external reinforcers that are
too "strong" will reduce the potential that intrinsic motivation to per-
form the behavior will take root, or will corrode any such motivation
that the individual already might possess. The objective of the wager-
ing agreement ultimately must be to effect lasting attitudinal and
behavioral change in the individual, not merely to induce perform-
ance of the particular goal that results in earning the reward. To
achieve such lasting change, coercive approaches or the use of "coer-
cive" reinforcers or penalties should be avoided."t°
Although there is no empirical evidence on the question,' it is
98. See E. DECI, supra note 83; C. KIESLER, supra note 87, at 164-65; R. PETrY & J.
CACIOPPO, supra note 89, at 169-70; Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic
Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 105 (1971); Deci & Ryan, The Empirical
Exploration of Intrinsic Motivation Processes, in 13 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (L. Berkowitz ed. 1980).
99. See R. PETTY & J. CACIOPPA, supra note 89, at 169-70; Amabile, Hennessey &
Grossman, supra note 82, at 14; Deci, supra note 98, at 115; Lepper, Greene & Nisbett,
Undermining Children's Intrinsic Interest with Extrinsic Rewards: A Test of the
"Overjustification" Hypothesis, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 129 (1973); Ross,
Salience of Reward and Intrinsic Motivation, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 245
(1975); cf C. KIESLER, supra note 87, at 167 ("[T]he amount of incentive offered for a
particular behavior is closily related to a perception of pressure to behave. The more one is
offered to act, the less options one feels one has."); Festinger & Carlsmith, Cognitive
Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 203 (1959)
(attitude change more likely when modest reinforcers are used rather than overly generous
reinforcers which lead the individual to attribute his response to the external motivator).
100. C. KIESLER, supra note 87, at 167.
101. The literature on the efficacy of coercive treatment is both scarce and methodologically
limited. See Meichenbaum, Legal Coercion and Treatment Adherence: Critical Questions and
Tentative Answers 17-21 (Jan. 1990) (unpublished paper, proposed for the MacArthur
Foundation Program of Research on Mental Health and the Law, on file with University of
Miami Law Review). Compare S. BREHM & J. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A
THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL (1981) (coercion may backfire, producing
"psychological reactance") and Ward, supra note 95, at 272 (finding "no scientific basis upon
which to accept the proposition that the use of legal coercion is effective in treating the
alcoholic") with Collins & Allison, Legal Coercion and Retention in Drug Abuse Treatment, 34
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1145, 1145 (1983) (patients legally induced to enter drug
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possible that the wager might succeed, to at least some extent, in situ-
ations involving some degree of coercion-when it is entered as a con-
dition of parole or diversion from the criminal process, for example.
But theory would predict the greatest potential for success for wagers
entered into on a purely voluntary basis. Only then will the psycho-
logical mechanisms of commitment and internal motivation that are
engaged by choice be fully mobilized. 102 People entering the wager
who feel they have no real choice but to do so may agree but resent it,
and as a result, may simply go through the motions of performance
without deriving real benefit.
The concepts of "coercion" and "voluntariness" present complex
psychological, 10 3 philosophical, 104 and legal"0 5 issues that deserve
more exploration than this brief discussion allows. To depict coercion
and voluntariness as a dichotomous inquiry is artificial and mislead-
ing. Virtually no choice in life is totally free of coercion; rather, there
are degrees of coercion falling along a continuum, and where we place
the dividing line between coercion and voluntariness is a normative
judgment."°c The values involved here are not exclusively the legal
ones invoked in determining whether a particular choice was coerced
in a legal sense. The law is primarily concerned with the protection of
abuse treatment stayed in treatment programs longer than, and did at least as well as, those
who sought treatment voluntarily); Fagan & Fagan, The Impact of Legal Coercion on the
Treatment of Alcoholism, 82 J. DRUG ISSUES 103 (1982); Flores, The Efficacy of the Use of
Coercion in Getting DWI Offenders into Treatment, 28 J. ALCOHOLISM & DRUG EDUC. 18, 24-
25 (1982) (individuals coerced into alcoholism treatment by threat of loss of driver's licence
did as well as those entering counseling voluntarily); and Salmon & Salmon, The Role of
Coercion in Rehabilitation of Drug Abusers, 18 INT'L J. ADDICTION 9 (1983) (treatment
coerced by possible loss of job worked effectively).
102. See C. KIESLER, supra note 87, at 167.
103. See Goldiamond, Protection of Human Subjects and Patients: A Social Contingency
Analysis of Distinctions Between Research and Practice, and its Implications, 4 BEHAVIORISM 1
(1976); Goldiamond, supra note 2, at 121-26.
104. See COERCION: NOMOS XIV (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1972); J. FEINBERG,
HARM TO SELF 229-68 (1986); J. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); A.
WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987); Murphy, Consent, Coercion and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L.
REV. 79 (1981); Murphy, Total Institutions and the Possibility of Consent to Organic Therapies,
5 HUM. Rrs. 25 (1975).
105. See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 104, at 172, 267-68, 287, 301, 308; Dix, Waiver in
Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 TEx. L. REV. 193 (1977); Singer,
Consent of the Unfree, Pt. II, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 101 (1977); Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); Tigar, Forward: Waiver of Constitutional Rights:
Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1970); Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional
Therapy and Research, 65 MINN. L. REV. 331, 383-92 (1981).
106. For an analysis of coercion as involving a continuum, see J. FEINBERG, supra note 104,
at 255-56; Goldiamond, supra note 103, at 27; and Jaffe, Law as a System of Control, in
EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 203, 216 (P. Freund ed. 1969). For recognition
of coercion as a normative concept, see J. RAz, supra note 104, at 148-57; A. WERTHEIMER,
supra note 104, at 211-17; and Sullivan, supra note 105, at 1446-50.
[Vol. 45:737
THE POWER OF THE BET
rights; in defining coercion, the law may not reflect other values, such
as program efficacy. Indeed, typical legal approaches to coercion may
well result in finding acceptable choices that should be rejected if
judged by the standard of program success and individual enhance-
ment sought to be accomplished by the governmental wager. The law
typically limits coercion, in the context of offers or proposals, to those
that are illegal or otherwise improper. 0 7 This requirement should
serve as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the voluntari-
ness required to enter into a wager with the government of the kind
proposed here. Undoubtedly, there are offers that, although not
improper, provide inducements that are quite irresistible, given the
circumstances and preferences of the individual involved.
Psychologist Israel Goldiamond has offered a useful behavioral
conceptualization of voluntariness and coercion, defining situations of
coercion and noncoercion through the use of a contingency analy-
sis.' 08 In this model, coercion is most severe when there are no genu-
ine choices and the consequences contingent on behavior are
critical.' °9 If an individual perceives himself coerced into entering a
governmental wager because he feels that, in the circumstances, he
has no real choice other than to do so, such psychological pressure
may interfere with the wager's potential for success. Psychological
pressure of this kind would not necessarily be unlawful; for example,
it would not invalidate a criminal defendant's choice to enter into a
plea bargain.110 However, such psychological pressure, although not
constituting coercion in a legal sense, would be counterproductive in
light of the purpose for which voluntariness is made a condition for
entering the wager-to promote the successful achievement of the
individual or social goal involved. As a result, only offers to wager
that do not create such psychological pressures should be permit-
ted.II' Rewards in particular wagers should, therefore, be carefully
107. See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 104, at 172, 267-68, 287, 301, 308; see, e.g., Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (A guilty plea "must stand unless induced by threats
... misrepresentation... or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper," such as
bribes); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-76 (1981) (standard of duress
limited to physical compulsion or improper threats).
108. See Goldiamond, supra note 103, at 20-34; Goldiamond, supra note 2, at 121-25.
109. See Goldiamond, supra note 103, at 23..
110. See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
111. The potential might exist for intense peer, teacher, and parent pressure to be applied to
individuals to influence them to engage in the wager, thereby reducing the individual's
perception that he is making a voluntary choice. This will dissipate the psychological power of
choice that is an important ingredient in the success of the wager. I reiterate my suggestion
that unless the wager is done on a purely voluntary basis, it will not be as effective. See supra
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tailored so as not to provide inducements that the individual involved
will find irresistible. Voluntariness, in short, should be the hallmark
of the governmental wager.
III. APPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE: WAGERING WITH THE
GOVERNMENT AS A MEANS OF ACCOMPLISHING
PUBLIC GOALS
In this section, I illustrate how the wagering approach might
work in a number of specific areas. I start with what undoubtedly will
be considered the most controversial and perhaps implausible applica-
tion-the problem of drug addiction. Many of the suggested applica-
tions described later-to increase productivity in civil servants, to
attack the welfare problem, and to deal with a variety of educational,
social, and health problems in both the public and private sectors-
are more plausible candidates for wagering. I start with the drug
addiction context, however, because it provides a good opportunity to
illustrate and examine in greater depth the psychological principles on
which wagering is based, and because it is useful to understand drug
addiction behaviorally. In addition, drug addiction is an intractable
social problem, and it is becoming increasingly clear that existing
approaches have not worked. We thus need to view the problem in
new and different ways if we are to craft creative solutions.
A. The Problem of Drug Addiction
Addiction to heroin, cocaine and its smokable derivative, crack,
as well as to other drugs of abuse, is widely considered to be our most
serious domestic problem." 2 Drug abuse leads to devastating individ-
notes 90-100 and accompanying text. I recognize the potential that the ideas advanced in this
Article could be perverted into a quasi-compulsive wagering scheme. This is not what is
contemplated here.
112. In his September 5, 1989 speech on national drug control strategy, President Bush
characterized the drug problem as "the toughest domestic challenge we've faced in decades."
N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1989, at 1, col. 6. In a recent New York Times/CBS News Poll, 64% of
respondents considered drugs to be the nation's single worst problem. Wicker, The Wartime
Spirit, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1989, at 23, col. 1. The drug problem is undeniably a serious social
problem, and it seems to be getting worse. But in my view, at least for many addicts, it is in
large part a symptom of a more serious underlying problem-the growing disparity in wealth
and opportunity in our society and the problems of social justice that this raises. Although the
drug problem exists in every social class, there can be little doubt that the widespread abuse of
drugs in our inner cities is related to these problems of social justice. Many poor people,
perceiving no real hope of escaping poverty, find drugs to be an attractive alternative to the
grim reality of their lives. See Skolnick, A Critical Look at the National Drug Control Strategy,
8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 101 (1990). Wagering with the government will not solve this
underlying problem, of course. This is the real and unmet agenda for social reform that cannot
be ignored if we are seriously interested in solving the "drug problem."
[Vol. 45:737
THE POWER OF THE BET
ual and public health problems, including death from overdose, the
birth of addicted babies, and the spread of AIDS from the sharing of
hypodermic needles. It causes family and social disintegration,
imposes serious costs to employers and to the economy generally, and
has increased crime dramatically. Drug abusers frequently deplete
their resources, lose their jobs, and alienate friends and family, ending
up on the streets, homeless, destitute, and hopelessly addicted. The
lure of enormous drug profits corrupts our youth, legitimate busi-
nesses, and law enforcement and other public officials. The social
stakes in solving the drug problem are exceedingly high, yet we seem
to be losing ground, notwithstanding the expenditure of billions of
dollars. New approaches obviously are needed.
Applying the principles of learning theory discussed earlier to the
problem of addiction can be illuminating. At a basic level, addiction
can be understood as operant behavior: The behavior of drug self-
administration is established and maintained by the pharmacological
effects of the drug, which function as a potent reinforcer.' 13 Not only
does the drug provide positive reinforcement as a result of its primary
biochemical effects, but it also serves as a negative reinforcer by
enabling the drug taker to avoid or reduce the stress or tension pro-
duced by various life events. 1 4 When the drug is physiologically
addictive, this negative reinforcement also includes the effect of the
drug in enabling the addict to avoid the distress of withdrawal, an
effect that can be a very powerful motivator.' 5 Positive reinforce-
ment also may be provided by the social status of drug-taking among
certain peer groups. In addition, under principles of classical condi-
tioning, the setting and stimuli associated with drug use, such as the
ritual of self-injection, can themselves become secondary reinforcers
113. See J. ORFORD, EXCESSIVE APPETITES: A PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW OF ADDICTIONS
174-80 (1985); Bigelow, Stitzer & Liebson, The Role of Behavioral Contingency Management in
Drug Abuse Treatment, in BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTION TECHNIQUES IN DRUG ABUSE
TREATMENT 36-39 (1984); Donegan, Rodin, O'Brien & Solomon, A Learning-Theory
Approach to Commonalities, in COMMONALITIES IN SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND HABITUAL
BEHAVIOR 111 (1983); Solomon, The Opponent-Process Theory of Acquired Motivation: The
Costs of Pleasure and the Benefits of Pain, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 691 (1980); Teasdale,
Conditioned Abstinence in Narcotic Addicts, 8 INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 273 (1973); Wilder,
Dynamics of Drug Dependence: Implications of Conditioning Theory for Research and
Treatment, 28 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 611 (1973); see also Vuchinich & Tucker,
Contributions from Behavioral Theories of Choice to an Analysis of Alcohol Abuse, 97 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 181 (1988) (behavioral explanation of alcoholism). For an analysis
of the pharmacology of heroin and the other opiate drugs, see Freedman, Drug Dependence, in
2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1591, 1597-1603 (3d ed. 1980).
114. See J. ORFORD, supra note 113, at 178.
115. See id. at 178-80; Wilder, supra note 113.
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that condition and help to maintain behavioral patterns." 6
This basic behavioral conceptualization of addiction is strongly
supported by experimental research on drug self-administration con-
ducted with both animal and human subjects across a variety of drugs
and methods of administration." 7  That animals show patterns of
drug self-administration similar to those observed in humans strongly
suggests that some preexisting psychopathology is not a prerequisite
to drug addiction. The behavioral view, however, does not mean that
drug self-administration is involuntary behavior, that the particular
drug itself causes the user to become addicted in a manner beyond his
control." 8 Many people who experiment with drugs or who use them
occasionally in moderation do not become addicted, and many who
become addicted subsequently discontinue their drug-taking volunta-
rily. " 9 Thus, drugs are not irresistible; some people simply decline to
resist them. Under the behavioral conception, the drug is a reinforcer
that influences the user's behavior. It is not, however, an automatic
116. See S. PEELE, THE MEANING OF ADDICTION: COMPULSIVE EXPERIENCE AND ITS
INTERPRETATION 66 (1985); Donegan, Rodin, O'Brien & Solomon, supra note 113, at 127-30,
132-34; O'Brien, Experimental Analysis of Conditioning Factors in Human Narcotic Addiction,
27 PHARMACOLOGICAL REV. 533 (1975); Wilder, supra note 113.
117. See J. ORFORD, supra note 113, at 174-75; Bigelow, Stitzer & Liebson, supra note 113,
at 37-38; Deneau, Yanagita & Seevers, Self-Administration of Psychoactive Substances by the
Monkey, 16 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGIA 30 (1969); Griffiths, Bigelow & Henningfield,
Similarities in Animal and Human Drug-Taking Behavior, in ADVANCES IN SUBSTANCE
ABUSE (N. Mello ed. 1980); Kumar & Stolerman, Experimental and Clinical Aspects of Drug
Dependence, in 7 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 321 (1977); Schuster & Thompson,
Self-Administration of and Behavioral Dependence on Drugs, 9 ANN. REV. PHARMACOLOGY
483 (1969). These studies tend to show that animals, confined in cages, given an opportunity
to administer drugs will do so repeatedly. Some studies show that animals in more natural
settings, for whom a greater variety of behavioral opportunities are open, will not self-
administer drugs as frequently. See S. PEELE, supra note 116, at 77-96 (reviewing studies).
These studies demonstrate that even powerfully reinforcing drugs do not automatically
determine behavior, but that situational variables play an undeniable role. The behavioral
paradigm, particularly as reconceptualized using the insights of cognitive theory, provides a
framework within which the role of these other variables can be understood. Drug-taking
behavior, although it varies depending upon the incentive preferences and values of the
individual, which are shaped by a variety of cultural, psychodynamic, and environmental
forces, is still learned behavior that can best be understood within the behavioral paradigm.
118. See S. PEELE, supra note 116, at 94; Becker & Murphy, A Theory of Rational
Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675, 682 (1988); Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to
Warn, 75 VA. L. REV. 509, 521, 531-34, 537-38, 544-45 (1989). Addiction to a variety of
substances (alcohol, nicotine, caffeine, chocolate) or behavior patterns (jogging, television
viewing, gambling, religion, romantic love) generally can be understood in terms of the basic
behavior paradigm. See Solomon, supra note 113, at 691. As with drugs, none of these
substances or activities causes addiction in a manner beyond the individual's control.
119. See J. ORFORD, supra note 113, at 271; Freedman, supra note 113, at 1597; Peele, A
Moral Vision of Addiction: How People's Values Determine Whether They Become and Remain
Addicts, 17 J. DRUG ISSUES 187, 202-03 (1987); Schwartz, supra note 118, at 521; Skolnick,
supra note 112, at 100.
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determinant of behavior. Although the drug may be a particularly
powerful reinforcer, like all reinforcers, its effects are cognitively
mediated, producing voluntary behavior in line with the user's value
preferences and choices. 120 Because some people value the short-term
effects of a particular drug very highly notwithstanding the long-term
negative consequences of addiction, they succumb to the strong temp-
tation that the drug presents. 2' Others, with different value prefer-
ences, will react differently.
There are many other theories attempting to explain drug addic-
tion-for example, as a medical problem, as genetically determined,
as culturally determined, as an individual adjustment reaction, as a
personality disorder, as a psychosocial problem, and as a moral prob-
lem. 12 2 Some of these theories help to explain why some people
respond to the reinforcement of drugs while others do not-that is,
why some people value the drug experience or are more susceptible to
it than others. Yet, except for the behavioral model, none of these
theories explain addictive behavior generally; none provide a unified
conceptual framework for understanding addiction. The basic para-
digm of learning theory, however, provides such a framework. Drug-
taking behavior, after all, is behavior, and like all behavior, it is
learned and maintained (and can be unlearned) in accordance with
these basic principles. All behavior, of course, is determined by a
variety of factors. While other theories of addiction may be helpful in
understanding some of these situational variables, and why some indi-
viduals respond to drugs while others do not, none have the explana-
tory power of the behavioral model.
I can confirm much of the validity of the behavioral model of
addiction out of a personal experience with drug addiction. The sub-
stance that I became hooked on was capuccino, which science knows
to contain a heavy dose of the addictive drug caffeine. I do not sug-
120. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
121. This explanation is consistent with an economic model of addiction based on rational
choice theory. See Becker & Murphy, supra note 118; lannaccone, Addiction and Satiation, 21
ECON. LETTERS 95 (1986).
122. See, eg., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 165-85 (3d rev. ed. 1987) (psychoactive substance use disorder); S.
PEELE, supra note 116; THEORIES OF DRUG ABUSE (D. Lettieri, M. Soyers & H. Pearson eds.
1980); Alexander, The Disease and Adaptive Models ofAddiction" A Framework Evaluation, 17
J. DRUG ISSUES 47 (1987); Craig, A Psychometric Study of the Prevalence of DSM-III
Personality Disorders Among Treated Opiate Addicts, 23 INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 115 (1988);
Freedman, supra note 113, at 1595-97; Nathan, The Addictive Personality is the Behavior of the
Addict, 56 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 183 (1988); Peele, supra note 119;
Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129, 1158-61(1986);
Schwartz, supra note 118, at 517-45; Tarter & Edwards, Vulnerability to Alcohol and Drug
Abuse: A Behavior-Genetic View, 17 J. DRUG ISSUES 67 (1987).
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gest that all drugs function the same, of course; some--cocaine, for
example-are undeniably more powerful as reinforcers than others,
and significantly more addicting than caffeine. There are several
other important differences between caffeine and other addicting
drugs. Caffeine, unlike many other addicting drugs, is entirely legal.
Moreover, although many addicting drugs are known to be addictive
and possibly dangerous, I had not realized this about caffeine. Never-
theless, despite these differences and many others, the experience of
becoming addicted to caffeine and that of becoming addicted to these
other substances bear important similarities. Indeed, I believe that
my experience with caffeine is not unrepresentative of the basic expe-
rience of becoming addicted to other drugs.
I start with an additional caveat: The following anecdotal
account does not purport to be an empirical investigation of the sub-
ject, and certainly not one meeting the rigors of acceptable research
methodology. No claim therefore is made that this experience con-
firms the validity of the behavioral model of addiction in a scientific
sense. My story, however, is offered in the same spirit in which medi-
cal research, until quite recently, was reported.
I started out as a strict teetotaler-literally. I never even drank
coffee, limiting myself to herbal teas. Nevertheless, at one point I was
induced to try capuccino. At first, I didn't really like it, but I per-
sisted. After a period of what could be characterized as "experimen-
tal use," followed by several years of enjoying it sporadically, often
with friends, I began to drink it everyday. I limited my acquisition of
the substance to one local purveyor in Coconut Grove, where I live.
Then, on a recent three week sojourn to New York to complete the
research on this very Article, I learned that my use of the drug had
grown into a dependence.
During my visit, I had planned to leave this drug at home, but
after as few as two days without a "fix," I felt strange. Accustomed to
being in excellent health, I suddenly noticed a malaise, a disturbance,
and the onset of a physiological reaction I virtually never experi-
ence-a headache. At first I thought I was coming down with some-
thing, a cold perhaps, or (perish the thought) the flu-a reaction to
the sudden chill of the city, then experiencing a record-breaking cold
spell over the duration of the entire month. But it wasn't that cold. I
had dressed appropriately, and enjoyed my occasional breaks from
the work to walk around town. And my nose wasn't even running.
I began to search for an alternative hypothesis to explaining my
symptoms. During one of my walks, I found myself in the West Vil-
lage and encountered the opportunity to purchase the drug that, little
[Vol. 45:737
THE POWER OF THE BET
known to me at the time, was responsible through its absence for my
growing symptoms. After consuming a quantity of it quickly, with
unexpected relish, I purchased an additional amount. My headache
was suddenly gone. I felt a slight "buzz," the dawning of the high
characteristically produced by the drug. I began to realize that I was
hooked, no longer the casual user I had thought myself to be. I had
been transformed from an experimenter to a user, to a devotee of the
substance, to one who was, let it be admitted, psychologically
addicted. And now my addiction was physiological; the feelings I had
encountered were the classic symptoms of withdrawal. I could no
longer deny the shocking truth: You see, I had become addicted to
capuccino.
Now, it may be possible to characterize my capuccino habit as a
medical problem or an individual adjustment reaction, or, given the
wide use and acceptability of caffeine in the legal and academic circles
in which I move, as culturally ordained. And I do recall my mother
being an occasional coffee drinker, suggesting the possibility of a
genetic explanation. But I find the behavioral paradigm more persua-
sive: I learned to like the taste of capuccino and the change in mood
it produced, and these inherent characteristics of the drug reinforced
my capuccino self-administration to the point that I developed a
habit, and one that ultimately took on a physiological character. The
positive reinforcement of the drug's primary effects and the secondary
reinforcement of such associated stimuli as its aroma and taste and
the pleasures of the patisserie in which I ingested it, had become sup-
plemented by the negative reinforcement of the desire to avoid the
unpleasant feelings of caffeine withdrawal. All this had conspired to
establish and maintain my habitual consumption of the drug.
Viewing drug addiction behaviorally has obvious implications for
designing approaches to the prevention and treatment of drug addic-
tion. As with other types of operant behavior, drug-taking behavior
can be influenced in predictable ways by manipulation of behavioral
contingencies. Obviously, the elimination or substantial reduction in
the supply of drugs will have a dramatic impact on the prevalence of
drug abuse problems. This is the "supply-side" solution, focusing on
interdiction of drugs at the border, defoliation of crops, and law
enforcement activities to deter distribution and use. Despite the com-
mitment of enormous resources to supply-side approaches, however,
the supply of drugs has steadily increased. Increased demand and
enormous profits encourage more suppliers to enter the market. As a
consequence, production increases, followed by a drop in price,
which, in turn, stimulates more demand, followed again by increased
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supply. It's simple economics. Without seriously dealing with the
demand side, these law enforcement approaches are unlikely to
succeed.
Dealing with demand means committing more resources and
designing new approaches to prevention and treatment. We need
more educational programs to reach children and adolescents before
they experiment with drugs, and treatment programs to help those
who already have developed a problem. The need for prevention and
treatment approaches would increase even more if we legalize drugs,
as is increasingly being suggested.
123
Existing models for prevention and treatment exist, but they are
not always successful. Many of the targets of such programs are
uninterested in participating. Many who do so are not sufficiently
motivated to succeed. It is easy, for example, to attend a school drug
education program but "tune out" the teacher. To motivate children
and adolescents to attend such programs and to participate meaning-
fully in them, the government could offer a wager. A reward, finan-
cial or otherwise, could be offered for successful completion of such a
program, with an appropriate penalty to be imposed if success is not
attained. Success could be defined as attendance at a certain percent-
age of classes and achievement of a particular score on a written exam
testing the assimilation of the material taught, just as we condition the
issuance of a driver's license on attaining a passing score on a written
exam testing knowledge of the rules of the road.
A straightforward presentation of the facts about drug abuse, if
attended to, should have the desired result for at least some people.' 24
All we need to do is tell our children the truth about how drugs work
and the serious risks they present. Surely the talents of our educators
and the media wizardry of Madison Avenue, which has proven so
successful in selling products ranging from detergent to political can-
didates, can be harnessed to graphically present the evils of drugs.
123. See Corcoran, Legalizing Drugs: Failures Spur Debate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1989, at
9, col. 4; Federal Judge Urges Legalization of Crack Heroin and Other Drugs, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 13, 1989, at 1, col. 5. See generally Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, 92 Pun.
INTEREST 3 (1988).
124. Of course, this is not true for everyone. Cognitive awareness does not always lead to
behavioral change. See, e.g., Atkin, Research Evidence on Mass Mediated Health
Communication Campaigns, in COMMUNITY YEARBOOK 3, at 655, 656 (D. Nimmo ed. 1979);
Farquhar, Maccoby & Solomon, Community Applications of Behavioral Medicine, in
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE 437, 460 (W. Gentry ed. 1984). Indeed, as the
experience with AIDS and tobacco illustrate, people sometimes act imprudently even though
they know better. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 181. As a result, education alone,
although it will succeed in preventing drug abuse for many people, will not do so for all. In
any event, the potential of educational programs can be enhanced through use of the wagering
approach.
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Only here, the facts-and nothing but the facts-should do; we
should avoid the moralizing, hyperbole, exaggeration, and distortion
that often have characterized both media advertising and our drug
education programs in the past, and that only undermine our credibil-
ity. Armed with the facts, many of our children will learn to say no
to drugs, just as many millions of Americans have quit or avoided
smoking and reduced their consumption of high-cholesterol foods in
the face of increased information concerning the health risks these
habits present. 125 Not all people will heed the warning and steer clear
of addicting drugs. Not all people are rational. But for those who
are, the anticipatory punishment of a life of addiction made easy to
visualize should serve as a sufficient aversive conditioner to make
them exceedingly wary of experimenting with dangerous drugs, and
even more reluctant to use them habitually.
The focus of prevention programs should thus be on getting the
message across as plainly and effectively as possible, in the earnest
hope that people will listen. The governmental wager can help to
achieve this goal. The reward for attendance and successful comple-
tion of such an educational program could be a modest financial
sum-for example, twenty-five or fifty dollars, a ticket to a desired
sporting event, a coupon redeemable at a local record store, reduced
rates for auto insurance, or other imaginative possibilities based on
the incentive preferences of the target group. Indeed, we could pres-
ent students with a menu of possible rewards and let them select those
that would most effectively motivate them. Penalties similarly could
be financial or otherwise-for example, the loss of a school privilege,
higher rates for auto insurance, etc. No one should be required to
accept the proposed wager as a condition of taking such prevention
programs, which should be as widely available as possible. Students
and others would be free to participate in such programs with or with-
out the wager, as they may choose. They should be advised that the
wager is purely voluntary, and no pressure to participate should be
applied.
For drug treatment, similar wagering schemes could be devised.
The government would like to convince heroin or cocaine addicts to
kick their habits. The principal difficulty usually is motivation, as a
number of drug treatment techniques presently exist that have been
used successfully by those motivated to stop using drugs. Inner-city
addicts with no job or family may experience few immediate social
125. See Becker & Murphy, supra note 118, at 687; Ippolito & Ippolito, Measuring the
Value of Life Saving from Consumer Reactions to New Information, 25 J. PUB. ECON. 53
(1984); Schwartz, supra note 118, at 538.
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rewards for becoming drug abstinent, and few immediate social pun-
ishments for continuing their drug use. Unless the requirements of
continued drug use become more painful than the drug is reinforcing,
or unless users become convinced that the long-term benefits of absti-
nence exceed the short-term costs, these addicts will not enter treat-
ment. A government offer to wager with the addict can be used to
restructure the behavioral contingencies of drug use, providing social
rewards for entering and successfully completing treatment and social
punishments negotiated in advance for failure to meet program goals.
Under the offer to wager, if the drug addict can stay off drugs for a
specified period of time, say six months, he will receive a particular
sum, say five hundred or one thousand dollars, or some other agreed-
upon non-monetary reward. 126 The government would require the
addict to deposit the equivalent amount (or some negotiated portion
of it) in advance which would be forfeited if the goal is not achieved,
so that failure not only will deny the addict the reward, but also will
result in his incurring an agreed-upon lOSS. 127 In the alternative, a
126. In view of the powerful reinforcement that the pharmacological effects of drug-taking
provide, the wagering program will need to use strong competing reinforcers for addicts who
are not highly motivated to give up their addiction. See Magura, Casriel, Goldsmith, Strug &
Lipton, supra note 39, at 117. Compare Beatty, supra note 39, at 522 (reporting lack of success
in a contingency contracting experiment in which only weak reinforcers, such as a daily pass to
leave the ward, were available) with Anker & Crowley, Use of Contingency Contracts in
Specialty Clinics for Cocaine Abuse, in PROBLEMS ON DRUG DEPENDENCE 452 (L. Harris ed.
1982) (avoidance of notice of drug use to drug abuser's employer successfully employed as
reinforcer); Boudin, supra note 39 (control of client's finances through jointly administered
bank accounts, post-dated client check payable to client's most despised organization, privilege
of continued contact with client's son used as reinforcers); Crowley, Contingency Contracting
Treatment of Drug-Abusing Physicians, Nurses, and Dentists, in BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTION
TECHNIQUES IN DRUG ABUSE, supra note 113, at 68 (loss of professional license successfully
used as reinforcer); Dolan, Black, Penk, Robinowitz & DeFord, supra note 39 (successful use
of detoxification from methadone treatment as reinforcer); and Polakow & Doctor, A
Behavioral Modification Program for Adult Drug Offenders, 12 J. REs. CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 63 (1974) (reduction in time on probation used as reinforcer).
On the other hand, the selection of reinforcers that are too strong or penalties that are too
severe could lead to a different problem-the "overjustification effect"-in which the extrinsic
reinforcer or penalty becomes more salient to the individual than the internal reinforcer,
thereby making it unlikely that intrinsic motivation will be triggered, or undermining any
existing such motivation. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. If the reward for
successful performance of the wager is too great, or the penalty for unsuccessful performance
too severe, there is danger that the individual will accept the wager and perform successfully-
remaining drug-free for a period-only in order to obtain the reward, or avoid the penalty, and
will realize no lasting positive changes in behavior. What is too great a reward or severe a
penalty will vary with the context and incentive preferences of the individual whose behavior
the program seeks to change. Much clinical sensitivity is therefore needed in the selection of
the reinforcers so that they are neither too weak to spark success nor too strong to produce the
"overjustification effect," and the penalties so that they are not so severe that they are deemed
coercive, thereby provoking a similar effect. See C. KIESLER, supra note 87, at 167.
127. Because, under the wagering proposal advanced here, the government will either
THE POWER OF THE BET
non-monetary penalty could be negotiated.'28
Under this contingency contract, urinalysis, or other types of
drug testing administered periodically, would be used to establish
whether the addict has won the wager, in which case he will receive
the amount in question, or has lost the wager, in which case the gov-
ernment will retain the amount deposited or the individual will suffer
operate or fund the wagering program, there may be concern that the individual agreeing to
participate in the program would run the risk of self-incrimination for past drug involvement.
Moreover, the individual may be concerned that, should he participate in the wager but fail to
succeed, his failure might make him the target of future criminal investigation. Obviously
these concerns could discourage participation in the program. Such concerns, however, seem
largely unfounded. First, prosecutors with inevitably limited resources tend to focus their
drug enforcement efforts against sellers or importers of illegal drugs. Although some
defendants arrested for drug offenses are also charged with possession of illegal drugs, they are
usually suspected of sale or possession with intent to sell. Moreover, drug use alone is not
always a crime. Although an admission of past drug use is obviously also an admission of past
possession of illegal drugs, it is simply not the practice of prosecutors to charge individuals
with the crime of drug possession for past use alone, at least in the absence of a seizure of at
least some quantity of the drugs so that they may be chemically evaluated to prove that they
were indeed illegal drugs.
In addition, the proposed wagering program is a therapeutic one, and it will most likely
involve, in at least a supervisory role, some clinician who will be required to respect the
confidentiality of the relationship with his patient under state evidence law. All employees
working under the supervision of such a clinician will also be bound by this requirement of
confidentiality. State evidence law typically accords patients of physicians, psychologists, and
sometimes other clinicians, a privilege against the admission in judicial proceedings of evidence
concerning any communications of a confidential nature within the therapeutic relationship.
Because, in entering the wager, the patient is voluntarily entering into what amounts to a
therapeutic relationship, the patient's communications, including the fact of his participation
in the program, should be covered by this privilege. In addition to the evidentiary privilege,
clinicians have an ethical responsibility to respect the confidentiality of communications with
their patients that is an important canon of professional conduct.
In order to insure the protection of confidentiality in a wagering program for drug
addicts, or for other populations involved in criminal activity, wagering programs should
adopt protocals governing confidentiality. Obviously these issues have already been faced by
existing government operated or funded drug treatment programs, such as methadone
maintenance programs for patients addicted to the illegal drug heroin. In New York City, the
Health Department operates a methadone program and provides strict protection of
confidentiality for this very reason. Indeed, when the police, in investigating a crime occurring
outside a methadone clinic, subpoenaed the photographs of patients in the program, Doctor
Robert Newman, then director of the Department's methadone program, resisted the
subpoena, asserting a doctor-patient privilege. Although the court ultimately rejected
application of the privilege because it found the photographs to be an aspect of the program's
intake administration rather than the patient's treatment, it suggested that facts not otherwise
available about the patient that relate more directly to the patient's treatment would be subject
to the state privilege. See People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.2d 379, 298 N.E.2d 651, 345 N.Y.S.2d
502 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974) (finding, however, that the confidentiality
provision of the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (42
U.S.C. § 242a(a) (1970)) applied).
128. For a number of non-economic penalties that have been successfully used in
contingency contracting programs with drug addicts, see supra note 126. See also D.
MEICHENBAUM & D. TURK, supra note 33, at 177-79 (discussion of negative reinforcers).
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the agreed-upon non-monetary penalty. The addict may have a con-
stitutional right to avoid such drug testing, at least if he is not
employed in certain occupations. 29 But he would be required to exe-
cute a waiver of this right as an express condition of the contract,
after full disclosure and ample time for contemplation and consulta-
tion.1 30 Indeed, such opportunity for consultation would be an
important ingredient of the program's ability to generate individual
change. Those interested in considering a wager with the government
would first be required to meet with a counselor, who would perform
an intake function like one done in a social service program worthy of
the name, but without the offensive paternalistic attitude that too
often has taken hold in public programs. The intake counselor would
provide information on the general rules of the wager and the areas
that would be open to negotiation if the individual was interested in
pursuing the matter, and on various alternative options open to the
individual, such as the public and private social, health, employment,
and legal programs available, their requirements, and how to obtain
their services. Information alone may meet the individual's needs,
and referral to other programs, including help in scheduling appoint-
ments, could be an invaluable, and in some cases necessary, step to
rehabilitation. No pressure should be exerted in any particular direc-
tion, although suggestions could be made when they are sought. Such
pressure, or the air of paternalism, could easily contribute to erecting
a wall of distrust and suspicion. Access to attorneys also could be
provided, perhaps even an independent attorney on the staff of or
reimbursed by the program, who would be the agent of the individual
and not of the program. The attorney can serve as a valuable ally in
solving the individual's social problems, including his legal problems.
Drug abusers, in particular, are likely to have a variety of interrelated
problems-employment, criminal, and family-many of which have
significant legal components. The counselor should have a similar
ability to refer the individual to needed psychological, health, and
employment counseling, which, again, could be furnished by
independent professionals employed or reimbursed by the governmen-
tal wagering program. The intake portion of the wagering program
can thus serve an important social work service, functioning to the
addict community much like a settlement house of old. Indeed, the
program, by attracting interest in those who ordinarily would reject
129. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
130. For an analysis of the validity of such a waiver, see infra notes 234-37 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 45:737
THE POWER OF THE BET
assistance, can serve an important outreach function, enabling other
existing services to be utilized more widely.
For those deciding to pursue further discussions about entering a
wager, the various kinds of counseling available could play an impor-
tant role in insuring that the wager was entered into voluntarily, and
not as a product of misunderstanding, duress, or other form of coer-
cion. The intake counselor, or some other specialist, would negotiate
the terms of the wager based on the individual's preferences, abilities,
and condition. The agreement would then be written in plain lan-
guage and presented to the individual for consideration. Ample time
should be allowed for further consultation at this time, again helping
to assure that the benefits of individual choice are engaged, unim-
peded by the potential for negative "psychological reactance" that the
feeling that one is being coerced into treatment could trigger. 131 The
consultation process could help the individual to form a support
group, composed of family, friends, and counselors, to help him
through the difficult times that will follow. The signing of the wager-
ing agreement also should be accompanied by a degree of formality,
perhaps including the requirement that his signature be witnessed by
members of the support group. His signature in their presence consti-
tutes the public acceptance and announcement by him that he is com-
mitted to the goal, thereby. engaging a number of psychological
mechanisms that can help bring it about. 132 Signing as witnesses also
can mobilize the members of the individual's support group to help
him meet the goal.
The reinforcer to be used-which the individual will receive for
meeting the goal or certain intermediate goals-should be carefully
negotiated. It should be sufficient to spark the individual's interest
and motivation, but not of such a magnitude as to provide an induce-
ment that the individual will find irresistible. The correct balance is
necessary in order to minimize the potential that the individual is
entering into the wager primarily to receive the "reward" rather than
to accomplish genuine change. Monetary reinforcers could be used,
but the creative use of non-monetary reinforcers could be even more
effective. The reinforcer could be paid at completion of the goal, or,
alternatively, a portion of the reward could be paid weekly or
monthly, or even variably, should the results of periodic drug testing
show that the individual has remained drug-free for the period in
question, with the remainder of the sum wagered becoming payable at
the end of the specified period.
131. See S. BREHM & J. BREHM, supra note 101.
132. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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The addict is thus provided a cash or other non-monetary incen-
tive, one that he chooses to attempt to gain at a time when he is ready
to do so, and his resolve to accomplish the goal is maintained by mak-
ing him bear at least a portion of the economic costs of his failure.
The costs of periodic drug testing will be borne by the government if
the addict ultimately succeeds in staying drug-free for the specified
period of time, or by the addict if he fails to succeed, either fully or
partially, out of the amount wagered. The government would not be
"betting against" the addict, as it might appear. If the addict wins the
bet, everyone wins. Eliminating or reducing the social costs of drug
addiction would be well worth the price. The government would be
offering to wager with the addict as an expression of caring, in effect
saying to the addict, "Let us help you with this problem, if you would
like our help, by setting up this wager which we think will facilitate
your achieving this goal that we both would like to see achieved. We
think we can help you to succeed by giving you an additional stake in
your success and by making you absorb some of the costs of your
failure. But whether you choose to participate is entirely your deci-
sion. We can only offer help; success or failure is ultimately up to
you."9
Obviously such an offer to wager by the government will not cure
the scourge of drug addiction. Indeed, drug addiction might seem to
be an unlikely candidate for the successful application of the wagering
approach in view of the potency of the drug as a competing reinforcer.
However, although it will not work for everyone, the wager might
tend to help motivate some addicts to rid themselves of their drug
habits, and to succeed in accomplishing the goal. Many addicts know
they should quit taking drugs, and that ultimately they will need to do
so. Few would wish for life as a drug addict. Yet, they temporize.
The marginal costs of each additional "high" seem small, particularly
for those who are myopic concerning the future. Perhaps the wager
can attract some of them into attempting to quit who would otherwise
continue to use drugs and to postpone, one day at a time, the decision
to stop.
We may not have the resources to treat all addicts, at least not all
at once. Public resources are always limited, and there are many
competing claims. Allocating these scarce resources based on the
motivation of the addict to end his habit makes considerable sense.
We are much more likely to succeed with those who are motivated.
An allocation on the basis of motivation would produce a more effec-
tive and efficient use of our limited public resources. Moreover, the
success of those addicts sufficiently motivated to accept the wager can
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be infectious. Other addicts, seeing their former fellows succeed, may
realize that there is a way out of their problem, and may be motivated
to follow in their footsteps. In effect, those who succeed may become
role models for the others, who, by observing the successful ones earn
the rewards of the wager (and of a life free of drugs), will themselves
experience a form of vicarious reinforcement. 133 For those uninter-
ested in being rescued from their drug problem, our options may be
limited. Some people like to swim in shark-infested waters. We can
erect large signs warning them of the perils. We can build better and
better life preservers, and learn to throw them closer and closer to
those who jump in despite the warnings. But unless they want to grab
on and help pull themselves into the lifeboat, there may be little we
can do, at least without sufficient resources to jump in and pull each
one out without his help.
Not everyone who succeeds in the wager will remain off drugs in
the future. Being drug free for a period of six months, however, may
itself be reinforcing. 134 In addition, behaving in a drug-free manner
for a period of time may set in motion forces that can bring about
attitudinal change concerning drugs. Attitudinal change, which is
essential for drug-abstinent behavior to take hold, is most likely to
occur when the period of abstinence is induced by reinforcement that
is not so strong that the individual feels that his behavior is the prod-
uct of external pressure, but rather is a behavior pattern that he has
freely chosen. The addict's perception that he has chosen to be drug-
free will create feelings of dissonance with his former attitudes about
drug-taking, thereby beginning the process of attitude change that is
essential for lasting benefits.1 35 At the least, a period of drug-free
behavior can be an important beginning, one that the addict, perhaps
with additional help from the government or family and friends, can
build on in the effort to accomplish his ultimate goal of ending his
addiction. As an additional reinforcer, those successfully completing
a treatment program could be given preferential access, at no or
reduced cost, to job training, educational programs, or psychological
counseling. In this way, we can attempt to build patterns of reinforce-
ment into the ex-addict's life so as to minimize the risks of backslid-
ing. 136 The social gains of even partial victories would be considerable
133. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 284-86, 301-03.
134. The "escape from an increasingly punishing cycle of drug procurement and use in his
natural environment" will provide an added reinforcement for at least some period. Beatty,
supra note 39, at 522.
135. See R. PETry & J. CACIOPPO, supra note 89, at 144; Festinger & Carlsmith, supra note
99.
136. For discussions of relapse prevention and a self-control program used to teach addicts
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and the social costs negligible.
This incentive/disincentive system would operate against the
backdrop of existing drug treatment programs and any new tech-
niques that might emerge. The addict would be free to choose any
drug treatment program he wished, a private or public one, or none at
all. The results alone, measured by periodic drug testing, would
determine the outcome of the wager. The superiority of one type of
drug treatment over another has not yet been demonstrated. It may
be that desire to change is the most important ingredient in success,
and that once that desire is present, any'treatment will do equally
well. 137 Indeed, a strong desire to change can be sufficient even in the
absence of treatment, as evidenced by the success many addicts have
experienced without therapy. The offer to wager is designed to stimu-
late such a desire to change, to convert such desire to commitment,
and to help maintain such commitment during the difficult times that
must precede success.
Allowing the addict to choose the drug treatment program he
wishes, rather than having the government dictate a particular pro-
gram for him, can itself be therapeutic. The potential for successful
treatment in a variety of contexts is increased when the individual
accepts treatment voluntarily rather than through coercion.' 38 Indi-
viduals coerced to participate in a treatment program-for example,
by court order; as a condition of diversion, probation, or parole; or by
correctional authorities--often just go through the motions, satisfying
the formal requirements of the program without deriving any real
benefits.139 Coercion also may be self-defeating, producing a negative
"psychological reactance" in the individual that produces failure."' °
The voluntary choice of a treatment program, on the other hand,
involves a degree of internalized commitment to the program that
how to anticipate and cope with the problem of relapse, see G. MARLArr & J. GORDON,
RELAPSE PREVENTION: MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES IN THE TREATMENT OF ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIORS (1985); D. MEICHENBAUM & D. TURK, supra note 33, at 194-202; Marlatt &
George, Relapse Prevention: Introduction and Overview of the Model, 79 BRIT. J. ADDICTION
261 (1984). The program can adapt the wagering technique for dealing with relapse problems.
137. Schwartz, supra note 118, at 537-38.
138. See P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, supra note 90, at 28; N. MORRIS, THE
FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 24 (1974); Winick, supra note 105, at 353, 360-61, 422; Winick,
Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 921, 980 (1985).
139. See COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY AND LAW OF THE GROUP FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION: THE
30s TO THE 80s, at 889 (1977); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 97-98 (1971); Winick, supra
note 105, at 331, 344-46, 353-54; Winick, The Right to Refuse, supra note 50, at 83-87.
140. See J. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (1966); S. BREHM & J.
BREHM, supra note 101.
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often will not be present when it is imposed involuntarily. 141
Research in a variety of contexts-involving children in treatment,
students in school, and medical and mental patients-supports the
value of individual choice in increasing performance.142 One study
showed that college students, assigned to perform a task, performed
better when given choice in selecting strategies for goal achieve-
ment. 143 Accordingly, addicts entering the proposed wager with the
government should be offered a variety of drug treatment programs
and allowed to choose which, if any, they would like to take advan-
tage of. Similarly, if resources allow, the government, on a purely
voluntary basis, could offer to perform a behavioral inventory of the
addict to assist him in understanding the environmental structures in
his life that perpetuate his drug-taking behavior, and how to rear-
range them to reduce or remove the social contingencies that
encourage and maintain his drug habit. The addict should be free to
accept or reject any suggestions made. Such a behavioral inventory
could present an important therapeutic and social assistance opportu-
nity for the addict, who, if this has not already occurred during the
intake or negotiation phase, could be directed (again on a voluntary
basis) to a variety of appropriate services, such as job training,
employment opportunities, occupational counseling, housing, educa-
tional programs, health services, and legal services. Indeed, the gov-
ernment could provide an incentive for participation in some or all of
these programs by offering discounts, scholarships, priority accept-
ance or placement, or other inducements.
As a hedge against abuse by non-addicts trying to cash in on a
sure bet, the government could insist on a documented history of
addiction in the period immediately preceding the making of the
wager as a condition for its acceptance. Some safeguards of this kind
would be necessary to avoid the self-defeating effect of having the gov-
ernment's offer to wager induce the very behavior it is designed to
eliminate. Perhaps candidates for the wager could be selected from
those already on waiting lists for other drug treatment programs. An
intake evaluation by an appropriate clinician also would minimize the
potential for abuse.
A public agency could administer the governmental wagering
program. The task could be assigned either to the agency principally
concerned with solving the particular problem (the Addiction Serv-
141. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
143. Earley & Kanfer, The Influence of Component Participation and Role Models on Goal
Acceptance, Goal Satisfaction, and Performance, 36 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISIONAL PROCESSES 378, 387 (1985).
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ices Agency or Health Department) or to an agency established to
administer governmental wagering generally (compare, for example,
New York's Off-Track Betting Corporation), or by private concerns
through a purchase-of-services arrangement with the relevant govern-
mental agency. This program, which could also administer wagers in
other areas, could emerge as an effective social services agency in its
own right.
B. The Problem of the Unproductive Civil Servant
Another application of governmental wagering to accomplish
public goals can be illustrated by the costly problem of the unproduc-
tive civil servant. Budgetary cutbacks and taxpayer discontent have
fueled increasing concern with lack of productivity in the public sec-
tor." After a period of probationary employment, civil service pro-
tection gives the overwhelming majority of government employees job
security in the form of protection from discharge absent specified
cause. 145 The employment-at-will doctrine, which civil service protec-
tion replaced in the public sector, had produced many abuses. The
major concern was political patronage, the practice of filling govern-
ment jobs with the appointing official's political cronies. Under the
patronage system, which began during the presidency of Thomas Jef-
ferson and flourished during that of Andrew Jackson, public employ-
ment was regarded as a privilege, and employees served at the hiring
official's discretion. Although, following the Civil War, grass roots
sentiment began to grow for civil service reform, it was not until Pres-
ident James Garfield was assassinated by a disgruntled and dejected
job seeker that Congress responded by passing the Pendleton Act of
1883, establishing the Civil Service Commission (now known as the
Office of Personnel Management). 1'" The Act sought to replace
144. See Jarrett, An Overview of Productivity Improvement Efforts in State Governments, 14
PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 385 (1985); Wakham, Productivity Improvement for Public Sector
Managers: A Federal Perspective, 14 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 333 (1985).
145. In a 1978 analysis, a Senate Committee estimated that there were 2.9 million civil
employees on the federal payroll, of whom 93% were subject to civil service protection. S.
REP. No. 969, U.S. SEN. GOV'T AFFAIRS COMM., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2723, 2723-24 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 969]. The
current statutory provision, as did its predecessors, prohibits the suspension or removal of such
employees except "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service," which must be
demonstrated at an administrative hearing. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 7503(a), 7513(a) (1988). Federal, state, and local governments combined are estimated to
employ 15.7 million public employees, representing 17% of the nation's non-agricultural
civilian labor force, over 82% of whom are state and local employees. Note, Developments in
the Law: Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1614 (1984).
146. The history is recounted in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 148-50 (1974), upholding
the validity of the procedural protections afforded by the Act and its successors against a due-
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patronage with merit selection and to insulate employees from dis-
charge for political or other inappropriate reasons.
147
The civil service model, now widely adopted by state and local
governments, affords a significant measure of job security to those
accepting public employment, often for their entire careers and at
wages generally lower than those prevailing in the private sector.
Civil service reform undoubtedly produced many benefits: the reduc-
tion of political patronage; the prevention of abuses by government
officials in the exercise of their virtually unfettered discretion to dis-
charge employees (and in the exercise of the enormous power over
their lives that this brought); the provision of economic and psycho-
logical security to government workers; and the increased ability of
the government to recruit and retain high quality employees.
On the other hand, civil service protection has resulted in a lack
of productivity by some public employees, particularly those at lower
levels.'48 Although many civil servants are dedicated and industrious,
many are not. Once they complete their probationary period, the
need of these employees to impress supervisors diminishes, both
because suspension and discharge are difficult, 149 and because wage
increases often are automatic, based on length of service or the rate of
inflation, rather than on merit.' Many become clock watchers, wait-
process attack by civil servants facing discharge, and Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 353-54
(1976), placing first amendment limitations on patronage dismissal. For more extensive
treatments, see C. FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE (1905); D. HARVEY, THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (1970); W. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN
BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900, at 119-33 (1982); P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES CIVIL SERVICE (1958); Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil
Service Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942, 947-77 (1976); and Note, supra note 145, at 1619-
32. The Pendleton Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403, was amended by the Lloyd-Lafollette Act
of 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 7 Stat. 555, and most recently was amended by the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. I 111 (currently codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 7501 (1988)); see Note, supra note 145, at 1632-50.
147. "The civil service system is the product of an earlier reform, which, in protest against
the 19th century spoils system, promised a work force in which employees were selected and
advanced on the basis of competence rather than political or personal favoritism." S. REP.
No. 969, supra note 145, at 2-3, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2725.
148. "Many managers and personnel officers complain that the existing procedures
intended to assure merit and protect employees from arbitrary management actions have too
often become the refuge of the incompetent employee." Id. at 3, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2725.
149. "It is relatively easy to discharge an unsatisfactory employee during the first year of
service (probationary period). After an employee has completed the first year of service,
though, existing law provides that an individual may be removed only for such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the service .... Id. at 9, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 2731.
150. See id. at 3, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2725 ("IT]he system's rigid
procedures provid[e] almost automatic pay increases for all employees .... ").
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ing for 5:00 p.m. so they can go home. Many care little about accom-
plishing more than the minimum required by the custom of the office,
which through peer pressure is kept rather low. In addition to per-
forming the bare minimum, many take full advantage of sick leave,
treating each day of sick leave to which they are entitled as paid vaca-
tion. Civil service employees in some agencies are notoriously ineffi-
cient and unproductive, and there is little that supervisors can do
about it, given the difficulties of firing or disciplining those with civil
service protection.' The resulting tolerance of incompetency and
inefficiency inevitably reduces the morale of the entire office, dimin-
ishing the performance even of dedicated workers.'52
The discrepancy in productivity and efficiency between the pub-
lic sector and private industry generally is enormous. This is not sur-
prising. In private industry, where the employment-at-will doctrine
still predominates and salary increases are more often based on merit,
151. A widely held impression is that a government employee cannot be fired,
regardless of unacceptable conduct or work performance. Although this is
untrue enough bad examples are available to give it credibility. But while it is
technically possible to fire unsatisfactory employees, appeals processes are so
lengthy and complicated that managers often avoid taking disciplinary action.
... [T]he number of employees actually removed because of unsatisfactory job
performance as distinguished from misconduct is relatively small .... Managers
embroiled in appeals often find that these processes consume all of their time and
attention. Some managers simply avoid taking necessary steps to discipline or
discharge employees in the first place. They find ways to work around
unsatisfactory employees, or they hope the employees will go elsewhere to work.
Id. at 9-10, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2731-32.
152. "When incompetent and inefficient employees are allowed to stay on the work rolls, it
is the dedicated and competent employee who must increase his workload so that the public
may be benefitted. The morale of even the best motivated employee is bound to suffer under
such a system." Id. at 3, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2725. Moreover,
competent employees, by observing the unproductive and inefficient behavior of their fellow
workers, and the fact that this behavior is reinforced by the system, will themselves learn to
behave inefficiently. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 290-91 (explaining this phenomenon
in terms of social learning and modeling theory). Not only will competent employees thus
learn the ways of their unproductive role models, but observing the unproductive employees
being compensated at the same level for less or inferior work will further reinforce inefficiency.
Such observations will engender the feeling on the part of the productive workers that they are
being inequitably compensated, which will in turn lead them further to reduce the level or
quality of their performance. Id. at 306.
Of course, for the same reasons, if the wages and other job benefits and privileges of
productive employees remain unrelated to job performance while the rewards of the wager are
available to their less productive co-workers, the productive workers may be encouraged to
decrease their productivity to become eligible for participation in the wager. In order to avoid
this perversion of the wagering program's intended incentive system, supervisors will have to
be sensitive to the need to reward productive workers, at least on a variable basis, in order to
reinforce their good job behavior and to avoid this potential disincentive to its continuation. A
bit of praise or encouragement may suffice to motivate many employees to continue their good
work habits. See, e.g., R. PErrY & J. CACIOPPO, supra note 89, at 170; Luthans, Paul &
Baker, supra note 97, at 319.
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there are direct financial incentives for employees to be productive
and efficient, and corresponding disincentives to perform poorly.
Although it has accomplished other benefits, civil service protection
has lessened or eliminated many of the incentives and disincentives
that relate so closely to job performance. When salary and other
employee benefits are provided on a non-contingent basis, rather than
tied to performance, behavioral psychology teaches that performance
inevitably will suffer and existing patterns of mediocrity will be rein-
forced and strengthened.1
5 3
Not only is the resulting lack of productivity bad for govern-
ment, whose ability to deliver services is already under intense pres-
sures as a result of the budgetary problems that most government
entities face, but it is also psychologically debilitating for the employ-
ees. Clock watchers doing the bare minimum come to regard their
jobs as meaningless rituals. Lacking a sense of achievement or craft in
their work, they suffer a loss of self-esteem. For many, their sense of
alienation from work and life must be unbearable.
To attempt to break up this pattern, the government could offer
to wager with at least the more unproductive civil servants to increase
their job productivity. Management-by-objectives scales could be
used to define and measure employee output, and goals could be set
for increased productivity over stated periods, say ten percent more
birth certificate applications processed in a two-month interval over
the preexisting baseline. Employees could be offered a wager under
which they would deposit a particular sum, say $250, and agree to try
153. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. An additional problem related to non-
contingent reinforcement that also produces complacency and lack of motivation among
workers due to insufficient incentives occurs when workers' efforts are pooled. "Social loafing"
theory has shown that individuals who work together generate less effort than when they work
alone. See Szymanski & Harkins, Social Loafing and Self-Evaluation with a Social Standard,
53 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 891 (1987). Not only do such pooling arrangements
limit the ability of workers to obtain individual feedback, but they also prevent supervisors
from evaluating individual performance, thereby diminishing the reinforcing effects of praise
and criticism. Id. at 891 ("[I]ndividual outputs were 'lost in the crowd,' and participants could
receive neither credit nor blame for their performance."). Like the provision of non-contingent
reinforcement, employee pooling structures interfere with the effects of reinforcement that are
an important ingredient in assuring productivity in more typical private-sector work settings.
Behavioral theory would predict that productivity will increase if these interferences with the
effects of reinforcement are reduced by making workers' individual accomplishments more
visible and rewarding those accomplishments through contingent reinforcement.
These insights argue for a broad restructuring of civil service protection. Perhaps civil
service practices could be restructured to increase the provision of compensation on a merit
basis in order to increase productivity. This as well as other more radical changes in civil
service protection may, however, be politically unfeasible. In any event, the wagering
approach suggested here may be attempted even within the context of a structurally
unchanged system.
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to accomplish the target goal. Programs to provide job training or
counseling could be made available to employees on a voluntary basis
to help them achieve the goal, if they wish such help. Successful
employees would receive a $250 payoff and the return of the $250 that
they deposit; unsuccessful ones would forfeit the $250 amount depos-
ited. Perhaps non-monetary reinforcers, such as a desired ticket to a
particular sporting event, concert, or play, an expense-paid vacation,
extra time off, or a bigger desk or office could be negotiated and would
be more effective. Alternatively, the government could use a system
of variable reinforcement in which the wager would provide monetary
or non-monetary reinforcement at unpredictable, variable occasions
when employees reach goals, rather than every time an employee
reaches a goal or intermediate goal, creating a "jackpot" effect that
may increase motivation even more than would reinforcement pro-
vided at regular intervals. 154 In selecting which work goals should be
subject to the wager and which reinforcers and penalties should be
used, managers should be sensitive to the "overjustification effect."1 5
The offer of a reward for a behavior that the individual already
regards as enjoyable, or use of too great a reward (or too severe a
penalty), can have the effect of undermining intrinsic motivation or
reducing the potential that such motivation will take root, thereby
decreasing the likelihood that the behavior will be performed under
subsequent nonrewarding conditions.'56
Participation in the wager would be purely voluntary. Not all
civil servants will agree to participate, of course, but some will. Those
who do-to obtain extra compensation or a desired non-monetary
reinforcer, because they like a challenge, or simply because they like
game playing-will likely succeed, to the benefit of both the govern-
ment and themselves. Accomplishing the goal will probably increase
job morale and bring added self-esteem in addition to the negotiated
financial or non-financial reward, which will itself reinforce good
work habits and productivity. Of course, some workers may not
maintain their productivity after incentives are withdrawn because
they have come to view the extra work they have begun doing pursu-
ant to the wagering program as deserving of extra pay or other bene-
fits.' Hopefully, however, the added self-esteem and self-efficacy, as
well as the continued approval of supervisors, will prevent backslid-
154. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 126 (discussing the "overustification effect").
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ing.I s By setting and accomplishing performance goals, workers will
increase skills and acquire and progressively improve strategies for job
success. Workers who had stagnated will again experience a sense of
learning in their work. Eventually, they may even experience a sense
of pleasure in their craft and pride in their work that they never had
imagined. These increased feelings of self-efficacy stimulated by suc-
cess in the wager can make productivity self-reinforcing, leading to its
continuation even beyond the time when the external rewards of the
wager are available. Moreover, if the individual attributes his efforts
to a choice he has freely made rather than to one produced by exter-
nal pressure, a period of increased productivity will stimulate feelings
of dissonance with his former non-productive attitude, which can
push in the direction of positive attitude change.159 Indeed, the con-
tingency arrangement should be structured so that the perception of
external pressure is minimized and the individual can feel that his
participation and performance were freely chosen and that he is
responsible for his own behavior."W
In addition, successful completion of the goals set by the wager
will inevitably increase the performance standards prevailing in the
particular office, affecting the productivity of all. Even those employ-
ees declining to participate in the wager may benefit from observing
those who do so, acquiring adaptive responses and skills through
modeling, increasing their own motivation and performance as a
result of vicarious reinforcement, and learning the basic lesson that
hard work pays off.161
C. The Welfare System
There is widespread agreement that the existing welfare system
offers incentives not to work, but instead to subsist on welfare pay-
ments. 162 Although half of welfare recipients receive subsistence pay-
158. See R. PErrY & J. CACIOPPO, supra note 89, at 170; Luthans, Paul & Baker, supra
note 97, at 319.
159. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
160. See C. KIESLER, supra note 87, at 164-65, 167.
161. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (modeling); and A. BANDURA, supra note
12, at 284-86, 301-03 (vicarious reinforcement).
162. See Stevens, The Welfare Consensus, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1988, at Al, col. 5. The
largest and most controversial cash public assistance program, indeed the central pillar of the
American welfare system, is Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), formerly
known as Aid to Dependent Children. See Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, 76 Stat.
185 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-15 (1988)). The Act creates a system of federal
grants to the states for local assistance programs administered by the states subject to federal
statutory and regulatory restrictions and the supervision of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services. For an overview of the program, see S. LEVITAN, PROGRAMS IN AID OF
THE POOR FOR THE 1980's (3d ed. 1980). For an historical account, see Lurie, Major Changes
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ments only temporarily, in response to a onetime misfortune, the
other half are "mired in a pattern of permanent dependency.' ' 163 By
rewarding idleness with cash benefits and providing a disincentive to
employment-the loss of benefits-the welfare system applies psycho-
logical theory perversely, reinforcing and maintaining the dependency
of recipients. The children of welfare mothers frequently grow up
without the education and skills necessary to become self-sufficient
citizens and workers, and without the incentives to acquire such
skills. And their children grow up the same way, perpetuating a cycle
of poverty and dependency. 164 Rather than reinforcing idleness, as
the existing system does, the welfare system should be restructured to
provide an incentive for recipients to leave the welfare rolls and
assume and continue productive employment.
in the Structure of the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 825 (1974). A classic
analysis of public welfare suggests that, historically, its major purpose has been to reduce
unrest among the poor during cyclical periods of high unemployment. See F. PIVEN & R.
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTION OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1972); see also
WELFARE IN AMERICA: CONTROLLING THE DANGEROUS CLASSES (B. Mondell ed. 1974).
Piven and Cloward trace the origins of public relief systems to the mass disturbances that
followed the long transition from feudalism to capitalism beginning in the 16th century. F.
PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra, at 8-22. Congress created the present American welfare system
in response to the mass unemployment and the rise of disorder that occurred during the Great
Depression, id. at 45-119, and expanded it dramatically during the urban crisis of the 1960's,
id. at 183-340. For recent criticisms of the welfare system, see, e.g., M. EDELMAN, FAMILIES
IN PERIL 76, 91-93 (1987); G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981); L. MEAD, BEYOND
ENTITLEMENT (1986); and C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY,
1950-1980 (1984). For a related criticism of AFDC as fostering family disintegration by
penalizing two-parent families and encouraging fathers to desert the home, see, e.g., M.
EDELMAN, supra, at 72; and R. MORONEY, SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: FAMILIES AND SOCIAL
POLICY 6 (1986). For related criticisms of Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a cash
assistance program for the aged, blind, and disabled administered by the Social Security
Administration, suggesting that it reinforces the continued disability of former mental patients,
see S. ESTRAFF, MAKING IT CRAzY: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PSYCHIATRIC CLIENTS IN AN
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 150-73 (1981). For criticisms that SSI discourages families from
caring for their own disabled members by penalizing the disabled who live with their families
or relatives compared to those who live in institutional settings, see R. MORONEY, supra, at
133, 144.
163. Stevens, supra note 162, at A21, col. 6.
164. By reinforcing dependency, the welfare system contributes to what anthropologist
Oscar Lewis described as the "culture of poverty":
Once it comes into existence it tends to perpetuate itself from generation to
generation because of its effects on children. By the time slum children are age
six or seven, they have usually absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their
subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing
conditions or increased opportunities which may occur in their lifetime.
0. LEWIS, LA VIDA: A PUERTO RICAN FAMILY IN THE CULTURE OF POVERTY xiv (1966);
see also Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, 215 Sci. AM. 19 (1966). But see W. WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY 137-38
(1987) (suggesting that poverty is more a product of social and economic forces than of cul-
tural ones).
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. There can be little doubt that welfare reform requires large-scale
education, training, and job placement programs, with a special focus
on teen-age mothers and others likely to be on welfare for long peri-
ods. Rather than requiring that welfare recipients participate in such
programs as a condition of receiving public assistance (the "workfare"
approach), 65 government could provide an incentive to encourage
voluntary participation in such programs in a more meaningful man-
ner. Welfare recipients could be offered a governmental wager under
which, if they participate in such programs and/or obtain and con-
tinue in a job for a specified period, they will receive a negotiated
monetary or non-monetary reward.' 66 In contrast, if those who enter
into the wager fail to perform satisfactorily, they will sustain an
agreed-upon monetary or non-monetary sanction. Individuals at
intake, or at the negotiation or participation stage of the wager, could
be offered, on a voluntary basis, the opportunity to participate in a
variety of training and counseling programs designed to facilitate
their social and occupational reintegration. These programs could
include remedial schooling, vocational training, and education in the
conventions of living and working-like setting goals, using budgets,
getting to work on time, and dealing with the boss, fellow workers,
and job frustration.
The wager can stimulate the motivation needed to influence at
least some welfare recipients to elect to engage in job training and to
accept job placement, and to participate in both pursuits in a mean-
ingful way, maximizing their potential for success. Some may decline
the wager but agree to counseling or job placement anyway. For
those who elect to participate in the wager, the promise of the negoti-
ated reward upon successful completion of the program, or perhaps
provided at periodic intervals following successful completion of
intermediate target goals, and the corresponding threat of the agreed-
upon sanction for non-compliance, can provide the needed incentive
to break up the pattern of learned helplessness 67 and dependency that
our existing welfare system has fostered. Hopefully, the welfare recip-
ient opting for such programs will gain a new sense of self-efficacy and
self-esteem that itself will reinforce future employment even beyond
the time when the extrinsic rewards of the wager are available. More-
over, for those successfully pursuing the wager, the economy may
165. The workfare approaches with which some states have experimented may only
produce technical compliance by recipients, who may merely go through the motions of
attending workfare programs without deriving any real benefits.
166. Creativity in the selection of reinforcement, tailored to the incentive preferences of the
individual, would increase the likelihood of success. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 96.
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take over and provide the continuing reinforcement that will maintain
their new behavior patterns. Indeed, changing demographic trends in
many labor markets produced by the sharp decline in the birth rate
two decades ago have made entry-level workers in many job catego-
ries scarce, increasing the demand for those motivated to succeed.
D. Other Applications
Other applications of governmental wagering can easily be
envisioned:
1. Wagering with public school students who have repeatedly
been truant or have failed courses or performed poorly, in order to
increase their school attendance or academic performance, the latter
as measured by increased grades, test results, or otherwise. A related
target for governmental wagering would be students identified as high
risks to drop out of school, in order to deal with a persistent and
troubling problem in American education-the failure of one of every
four high school students to graduate.
2. Wagering with public employees to induce them efficiently to
master a newly introduced technology-e.g., a computerized record-
keeping system, a new hospital diagnostic device, word processing
rather than manual typewriting, a new tool--or a newly adopted sys-
tem, schedule, or procedure for job performance.
3. Wagering with mental patients to facilitate their discharge
from hospitals, their avoidance of rehospitalization, and their employ-
ment, each for specified periods of time.
4. Wagering with juvenile offenders, or with prisoners whose
sentences are about to expire or who are about to be released on
parole, to avoid recidivism for a specified period of time.
5. Wagering with individuals who are repeatedly intoxicated in
public, or deinstitutionalized mental patients who have repeatedly
committed a variety of public nuisances, to induce them to refrain, for
a specified period, from their antisocial behavior.
6. Wagering with those who are repeatedly ticketed for driving
while intoxicated, to avoid a repetition of their life-threatening
behavior.
7. Wagering with mental patients to induce them to accept and
complete a course of treatment that they may have a constitutional or
statutory right to refuse.
8. Wagering with poverty-level pregnant women to induce
them to obtain appropriate prenatal care and appropriate pediatric
care once their babies have been born.
9. Wagering with teenagers who have previously had an
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unwanted pregnancy to induce them to avoid becoming pregnant
again for a specified period, or until graduation from high school or
marriage.
10. Wagering with police officers for whom there have been
prior complaints, to induce them to respect the constitutional rights
of citizens by completing a specified number of arrests, searches, or
interrogations without a judicial or administrative finding of fourth,
fifth, or sixth amendment violations.
11. The same principles can be applied in the private sector, for
example, by private employers utilizing the wager to increase
employee productivity or reduce the incidence of social or health
problems that themselves decrease productivity, such as employee
drug abuse, alcoholism, or obesity. Employers, for example, can use
the technique to induce employees to participate in exercise or other
"wellness" programs designed to improve employee health and
reduce absence due to illness. The goal can be set in terms of the
number of hours per week or month spent in the program for a speci-
fied period, such as six months. In the alternative, specific health
goals can be set or negotiated, such as a specified weight loss per
month, or reduction in blood pressure, or even a reduction in sick
days taken. Many employers already recognize the benefits of insti-
tuting or subsidizing such employee health and exercise programs.
Use of the wagering technique can provide an additional incentive for
their successful utilization, with great potential gain to employer and
employee alike.
Any and all existing mechanisms for accomplishing these goals
can remain undisturbed. No school child, welfare recipient, patient,
prisoner, or employee would be required or pressured to enter into the
wager. Government (or the private employer) would merely make
the individual an offer which he would be fully free to accept or reject.
The wager would function merely as a motivator for the individual to
engage in (or refrain from) some act in order to accomplish self-
improvement or the achievement of certain social goals.
One predictable problem is that some individuals, such as welfare
recipients who are destitute, will lack the funds necessary to enter into
the wager. Perhaps a non-economic sanction can be negotiated, and
there is room for creativity here.' 68 In any event, the government
168. Individuals could always agree to forego certain privileges that they already possess,
for example, to attend the school dance or basketball game, to take a coffee break, to have
access to the soda machine, or to relinquish certain possessions temporarily, such as their
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should not dispense altogether with the deposit of at least some
amount. If the deposit requirement were waived, the individual's
stake in the outcome of the wager would be lessened, perhaps consid-
erably, with a resulting decrease in motivation to succeed. For those
with little to begin with, even a small stake in the wager may enhance
motivation. In the alternative, perhaps friends or family members
could provide a loan or other subsidy to allow the individual to make
the wager. This presumably would not materially reduce the individ-
ual's motivation, and may indeed increase it. Considerations of fam-
ily obligation, or the wish to avoid disappointing family or friends,
could themselves provide the necessary stake in the outcome.' 69
Moreover, giving family and friends their own stake in the outcome of
the wager might have the therapeutic effect of marshalling the family,
and the members of the individual's existing support group, to shape
the individual's behavior and to change his social environment-an
environment that might well serve to reinforce his problem-in ways
that will help him achieve the goal.' 7°
In some circumstances it may be appropriate for the governmen-
tal agency to reduce the amount that the individual would need to
risk in the wager. In the case of those unable to deposit an amount
equal to the amount of the reward that will be paid by the government
in the event the goal is achieved, it may be appropriate to accept the
deposit of a specified lower amount. In a sense, the government
would be giving the individual odds on the accomplishment of the
goal. For example, a one hundred dollar wager to remain employed
for a period of six months that would return a five hundred dollar
payment if the goal is achieved could be analogized to a wager where
the odds are five-to-one. The particular discount permitted, if one is
to be permitted, would not be calculated, however, based upon the
likelihood of achievement of the goal. Rather, considerations of the
individual's ability to post the sum in question and its ability to func-
tion as an effective motivator would be dispositive. For a destitute
welfare recipient, for example, the deposit of one hundred dollars
might well evidence a significant degree of seriousness in the accom-
driver's license, bicycle or bus pass (necessitating that they walk to school or work). For
discussion of the use of creative reinforcers, see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
169. On the other hand, borrowing from friends and relatives may produce negative
consequences in some instances. The individual's failure to make repayment in accordance
with previous agreements or the refusal by friends or relatives to loan money may create major
discord among families and friends. For certain populations, the risk that encouraged
borrowing may produce such disruptive influences, may exceed the benefits.
170. For the suggestion that providing a group reward will motivate the group to help a
particular member whose performance is in doubt to perform, see A. BANDURA, supra note 2,
at 281; and Wexler, supra note 24, at 104.
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plishment of the goal and provide a sufficiently high degree of motiva-
tion to bring it about.
Within legislatively set budgetary limits, the governmental
agency also could be permitted to offer wagers in a variety of specified
amounts, for example, one hundred dollars, five hundred dollars, or
one thousand dollars, allowing the individual to select the amount he
wishes to wager. A variety of non-monetary reinforcers, either speci-
fied in advance or negotiated with the individual, also could be made
available. Permitting such individual choice in the setting of stakes
would increase motivation both to enter the wager and to succeed in
reaching the goal.
IV. THE LEGALITY OF GOVERNMENTAL WAGERING
A. The Ban on Enforcement of Gambling Contracts and Other
Contract Law Problems
Would this use of the wager by the government fall within state
statutory bans on gambling, thereby preventing the government and a
willing individual from entering into such an arrangement, or permit-
ting the individual to rescind the contingency contract if he fails to
perform, in order to avoid suffering the agreed-upon sanction for non-
performance? English common law did not consider wagering con-
tracts illegal.'lI American common law, on the other. hand, generally
regarded wagering contracts as illegal, or at least voidable as against
public policy.I72 Moreover, gambling is generally made a crime.173
The crime of gambling is typically defined broadly, banning the
playing of a number of specified games such as keno or poker or any
"other game of chance" for money or other thing of value. 74 Persua-
sive arguments can be made that the governmental wager or contin-
gency contract would not constitute illegal gambling. It does not
involve gambling on the outcome of a game of chance like dice or
roulette, or even on a game of skill, such as football or boxing, in
which contestants other than the bettor will compete. Rather, the
individual controls the contingency that will lead to the payoff or pen-
alty in question. Moreover, the governmental wager would not impli-
cate the public policy considerations thought to justify the prohibition
171. See, e.g., Hamoden v. Walsh, I Q.B.D. 189 (1876); R. BRENNER & G. BRENNER,
GAMBLING AND SPECULATION: A THEORY, A HISTORY, AND A FUTURE OF SOME HUMAN
DECISIONS 58 (1990); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.2, at 331 n.4 (1982).
172. See, e.g., Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499 (1884); Collamar v. Day, 2 Vt. 144 (1829);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178, illustration 1 (1981), § 199(b), illustrations 4,
5.
173. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 849.08 (1989).
174. Id.
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on gambling.175  Unlike the illegal gambling contract, it does not
involve an arrangement in which one party is getting something for
nothing, thereby reducing the incentives to engage in socially produc-
tive activities and encouraging "shiftlessness, poverty, and
immorality."'
' 76
It is not always easy to distinguish illegal wagering contracts
from other "aleatory" contracts that have a legitimate commercial or
other purpose and are not considered contrary to public policy, but
instead are held to be lawful and enforceable. 177 According to Profes-
sor Corbin, a wagering agreement is illegal where one or more
promises is expressly conditioned upon the happening of a fortuitous
event, and this conditional promise is not matched by any agreed
equivalent performance given in exchange. 78  A number of lawful
aleatory contracts also condition performance on some fortuitous or
uncertain event, but what distinguishes the unlawful wagering agree-
ment is that there is no agreed exchange of equivalent performances
by the parties in the wager. "Upon full performance by both, as
agreed, one of them is sure to get something for nothing.' 79 Corbin
also distinguishes lawful aleatory contracts from unlawful wagering
contracts on the basis that the risk that is assumed by the promisor in
the latter is created by the bargain itself.'80 Aleatory contracts of
insurance or suretyship are distinguished from illegal wagering con-
tracts on this basis. The governmental wager, even if deemed to itself
create the risk involved, would nonetheless fail to satisfy the require-
ment of no agreed exchange of equivalent performances such that,
upon full performance, one of the parties gets something for nothing.
Upon full performance of the governmental wager, both parties are
the gainers, and therefore neither can be said to have received some-
thing for nothing. The individual receives the agreed-upon reward or
reinforcer, and the government receives the benefit of the individual's
acting in a socially useful way, or discontinuing his socially inappro-
priate conduct. The governmental wager can therefore be distin-
guished from an illegal gambling contract.
Under general principles of contract law, a promise is not insuffi-
175. See Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 687-88, 690-91
(1935) (courts should not void contracts calling for actions that may be illegal as a matter of
statute on the grounds that they violate public policy without a determination that the policy
underlying the statute is implicated).
176. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 171, § 5.2, at 331 n.4.
177. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 737, 1481 (1963).
178. Id. § 1481, at 638.
179. Id. § 1481, at 639.
180. Id.
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cient consideration for a return promise merely because it is condi-
tional upon an uncertain or fortuitous event, and therefore may never
have to be performed. 1 ' Ordinarily, the promise to forbear from the
exercise of a particular type of conduct is deemed to be adequate con-
sideration to support a contract. 12 In Hamer v. Sidway,l13 the classic
case, a man promised to give his nephew five thousand dollars if he
refrained from drinking, smoking, swearing, or playing cards for
money until he reached his twenty-first birthday. Although the
nephew fulfilled his part of the bargain, the uncle died, and his execu-
tor refused to make the payment, alleging lack of consideration. The
court held for the virtuous nephew, finding that his act in refraining
from this lawful, although deleterious, conduct at his uncle's request
constituted valid consideration sufficient to support the uncle's
promise.
By contrast, where a promisor already is under a legal duty, his
further undertaking to discharge that duty usually is not considered
valid consideration because he already has an existing duty to perform
the act promised.I 4 In the type of governmental wager illustrated by
the wager with a drug addict to discontinue his drug use, the conten-
tion can be made that because the drug addict already is under a legal
duty not to use illicit drugs, his promise to forbear from their use
cannot constitute valid consideration. If this contention is accepted,
the drug addict could rescind the agreement and avoid the agreed-
upon sanction if he fails to perform,"8 5 thereby destroying an impor-
tant part of the psychological incentive system on which the contin-
gency contract is based, and undermining its therapeutic value.
Would the fact that the individual entering the governmental wager is
under an existing legal duty to perform as he promises he will-the
addict's duty to avoid taking illegal drugs or the civil servant's duty to
work productively-lead courts to decline to enforce such wagering
bargains for lack of consideration? This result seems extremely
unlikely for a number of reasons. First, although courts in contracts
cases continue to pay homage to the requirement of consideration,
few actually void contracts on this basis.'86 This observed anomaly
suggests an impending paradigm shift.'87 While scholars have not yet
181. Id. § 737, at 437; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 76 comment c (1981).
182. See A. CORBIN, supra note 177, § 135, at 575.
183. 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891).
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981); A. CORBIN, supra note 177,
§ 135, at 578; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 171, § 4.21, at 272.
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
186. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 63 (1974).
187. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 171, § 2.18, at 87-88; G. GILMORE, supra note 186,
at 87-88; Farber & Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible
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concluded that the consideration requirement is a vestige of formal-
ism,""' in large part it is precisely that. As long as a bargain is seri-
ously entered into with sufficient formal or ceremonial manifestations
to impress the parties that their arrangement will be legally binding, it
should not be unenforceable for lack of consideration.8 9 To the
extent courts insist on consideration, allowing the formal recitation of
a promise to pay nominal consideration ("ten dollars and other good
and valuable consideration" in form contracts, or a peppercorn in the
example my contracts teacher used to beat us up with) to meet the
requirement suggests a form of genuflection to a hollow idol. It is
reasonable for drug addicts or civil servants to enter into a wagering
bargain in order to help themselves attain a goal that is important to
them and to the government, and one that thus plainly is in the public
interest. Moreover, the wager with the government will be reflected
in a written agreement ceremoniously (and perhaps even publicly)
entered into. As a result, courts should not employ the consideration
doctrine to prevent such a bargain from being enforced on the basis of
the individual's preexisting legal duty to do that which he promises.
Even if the consideration requirement is taken seriously in this
context, the addict or worker is doing more than promising to do his
duty; he is promising to use his best efforts to try to meet his public
duty, something that he has not done before. This commitment, and
his participation in an optional arrangement that will increase the
likelihood that his duty finally will be discharged, is a promise that
the law should honor. Moreover, the consideration problem
presented in a wager with, for example, the drug addict should be
dismissed because the contingency contract with the drug user
imposes not only the requirement that he forbear from using illegal
drugs for a period of time, but also that he submit to periodic drug
testing, a requirement not otherwise imposed by the law. This latter
undertaking is an independent promise of performance that itself
should constitute sufficient consideration to support the agreement.19°
Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 905, 929, 945 (1985); Knapp, The Promise of the
Future-and Vice Versa: Reflections on the Metamorphosis of Contract Law (Book Review), 82
MICH. L. REV. 932, 938-42 (1984) (reviewing E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (1982)). For the
classic analysis of the concept of the paradigm shift, in the context of the evolution of scientific
theory, see T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
188. See A. CORBIN, supra note 177, §. 111, at 495-96; G. GILMORE, supra note 186, at 21;
Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
189. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 187, at 929-30, 945; Fuller, supra note 188 at 799;
Knapp, supra note 187, at 938.
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981) ("Performance of a legal
duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not
consideration; but a similar performance is consideration if it differs from what was required
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Even a promise that is not supported by consideration can be
enforced if it results in reasonable reliance on the part of the other
party, who changes his position in response to the promise.' 9' The
requirements for such promissory estoppel would be satisfied in the
context of the governmental wager. Because governmental resources
in any wagering program are inevitably limited, the government, by
entering the wager with the individual, is in effect allocating a scarce
resource-the opportunity to participate in the program-to the indi-
vidual, in reasonable reliance on his promise to perform. As a result,
for several reasons the governmental wager should be considered
legally enforceable.
Not only does the wager with the government avoid these con-
tract law pitfalls and fail to implicate the public policies that tradi-
tionally have served to justify the ban on gambling contracts-the
avoidance of idleness and immorality' 92-but it also fails to violate
another major public policy concern underlying statutory prohibitions
on gambling-the desire to avoid the spread of pathological gambling.
Gambling contracts are not enforced because their enforcement
would violate a number of public policies against gambling. Public
attitudes concerning gambling, however, have shifted dramatically in
recent years, as evidenced by the reaction to Pete Rose's resignation
from baseball in the wake of revelations in 1989 concerning his gam-
bling activities. 193 Wagering in America (excluding friendly bets
between individuals) is estimated to have increased 57% since 1983,
and Americans were thought to have spent $278 billion on betting in
1989. 94 The largest component of this increase involves legal gam-
bling.' 95 Although in 1964 only one state, New Hampshire, had a
lottery, by 1988 thirty-two states and the District of Columbia oper-
ated lotteries and collected an estimated seventeen billion dollars in
1988, an increase of 230% from 1983.196 There is broad agreement
that this state-sponsored gambling is largely responsible for the huge
increase in all types of wagering. 197 Legislatively sanctioned lotteries
and other kinds of gambling have placed a public imprimatur of legiti-
by the duty in a way which reflects more than a pretense of bargain."); E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 171, § 4.21, at 273.
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §,90 (1981).
192. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 176, § 5.2, at 331 n.4; supra notes 171-176 and
accompanying text.
193. See Church, Why Pick on Pete?, TIME, July 10, 1989, at 16.
194. Id. at 16, 18.
195. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
196. Id. at 18.
197. Id. at 20.
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macy on gambling generally, accounting in large part for its increased
popularity.
Although public attitudes concerning gambling are obviously in
flux, there is continued concern about the social problem of compul-
sive or pathological gambling. Preventing the spread of pathological
gambling serves as a major justification for the continued prohibition
on illegal gambling. The question may be raised whether approving
governmental wagering of the kind proposed here would further legit-
imize gambling generally, and therefore further encourage pathologi-
cal gambling. The spread of the lottery and other kinds of legal
gambling, by making gambling accessible to more people, undoubt-
edly has increased the prevalence of pathological gambling. The gov-
ernmental wager proposed here, however, should not have this
adverse effect.
A number of theories seek to explain compulsive gambling
behavior, but none would support the concern that the governmental
wager involved here would encourage pathological gambling. Gam-
bling, of course, can be explained behaviorally. '9 Indeed, the slot
machine, previously mentioned as an illustration of variable ratio
reinforcement, is explicitly based on principles of operant condition-
ing.199 Will success in a wager with the government concerning the
attainment of job performance or educational goals, for example, fol-
lowed by receipt of the agreed-upon reward, reinforce wagering
behavior in more traditional gambling contexts? This danger seems
unlikely. Compulsive gambling involves betting on games of chance,
such as dice, roulette, or horse racing, that are decided quickly and
provide immediate reinforcement after the bet is won, as well as the
thrill of anticipating and experiencing the win. The governmental
wager, by contrast, involves performance within the individual's con-
trol and lasts over an extended period. Accordingly, it seems unlikely
that engaging in the governmental wager will turn people into com-
pulsive gamblers.
Some research links problem gambling behavior with what has
been termed the "illusion of control" phenomenon." ° Under this the-
ory, certain cues suggesting that an individual has had a measure of
control over the outcome of a game will increase that individual's per-
ception that he will be able to control the game's chance-determined
198. See J. ORFORD, supra note 113, at 175-78; Donegan, Rodin, O'Brien & Solomon, supra
note 113.
199. See J. ORFORD, supra note 113, at 176; supra note 70 and accompanying text.
200. See Burger & Smith, Desire for Control and Gambling Behavior Among Problem
Gamblers, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 145 (1985); Langer, The Illusion of
Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 311 (1975).
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outcome, and this illusion of control in turn will increase his gambling
behavior.201 To the extent that participation in a governmental wager
of the kind described here will produce feelings of control in individu-
als who are successful in the wager, these feelings may have the bene-
ficial effect of reinforcing future behavior which is in line with the
socially productive conduct the wager with the government seeks to
reward. Whether such feelings of control also would reinforce illegal
gambling behavior, however, seems unlikely. Engaging in a long-term
course of behavior pursuant to a wager with the government would
not seem comparable to betting on the outcome of sporting events or
participating in games of chance. It is difficult to believe, therefore,
that positive feelings engendered by participation in the former activ-
ity would somehow transfer to the latter in ways that would reinforce
pathological gambling.
A newly emerging theory of gambling behavior suggests that
compulsive gamblers may have an abnormality of the adrenergic sys-
tem and may engage in gambling behavior to increase the levels of
certain brain chemicals.20 2 To the extent that gamblers in some fash-
ion become addicted to the rush of adrenalin that gambling produces,
it would seem unlikely that the long-term activities involved in the
governmental wager would stimulate such a chemical response.
It thus seems doubtful that implementation of the governmental
wager would lead participants to become pathological gamblers.
Wagering with the government will hopefully produce socially useful
behavior, and will not breed compulsive gambling, corruption, loan-
sharking, criminality, or other antisocial or undesirable conduct asso-
ciated with gambling. The public policy concerns underlying statu-
tory prohibitions on gambling would therefore not be implicated by
such governmental wagers.
The governmental wager is more appropriately regarded as a
contractual arrangement involving the bilateral exchange of promises
to perform reasonably commensurate acts. Indeed, it is very much
like a construction contract, in which the contractor receives an
agreed-upon fee if a project is completed by a particular date but
incurs a specified penalty as liquidated damages for each day the pro-
ject's completion is delayed.2 "3 In a sense, the contractor is gambling
on his ability to complete the project on time, and thus receive the
201. Burger & Smith, supra note 200.
202. See Roy, De Jong & Linnoila, Extraversion in Pathological Gamblers: Corrolates with
Indexes of Noradrenergic Function, 46 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 679 (1989).
203. 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 78, at 733-34 (3d ed. 1970); see, e.g., Robinson v.
United States, 261 U.S. 486 (1923); Morgen & Oswood Const. Co. v. Big Sky of Montana,
Inc., 171 Mont. 268, 557 P.2d 1017 (1976).
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entire fee and avoid the penalty, and the owner is hoping that the fee
provision and penalty clause will induce timely performance. As long
as the stipulated penalty is not unreasonable under the circumstances,
or out of proportion to the anticipated losses resulting from breach,
which often are difficult to estimate, such an arrangement is not
deemed an unenforceable penalty2° or illegal gambling. Instead, the
courts consider it a legally enforceable contract, a commercially rea-
sonable arrangement that both parties enter voluntarily because each
perceives it to be in his best interests to do so. The institution of
private contract is premised on the desirability of enforcing such
mutually agreed-upon, voluntary undertakings. 20 5 Businessmen intui-
tively understand the principles of behavioral psychology that operate
to induce each party to fulfill his obligations under the contract.
Indeed, when the government acts as a private party in entering into
contracts with business and industry, as it frequently does, govern-
ment today undoubtedly being the largest purchaser of goods and
services in our society, it employs these principles, utilizing penalty
clauses to induce performance. °  Why shouldn't the government be
free to use the same techniques when it acts in the public health and
social service areas? The social costs that government is attempting to
avoid through the wager are extremely difficult to estimate, making
agreed-upon liquidated damages reasonable whether monetary or
non-monetary in nature. The government will undergo expenses in
connection with the negotiation, preparation, and monitoring of the
wagering contract, and will lose the social benefits sought to be
accomplished. A fixed penalty, provided that it is not unreasonable in
light of these difficult-to-estimate losses, will only partially compen-
sate government for its expenses and the individual's failure of per-
formance, and it certainly will not constitute an unfair windfall to the
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356, 356 comment b (1981); see, e.g.,
Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Justice, 673 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1982); Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v.
Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 361 N.E.2d 1015, 393 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1977); E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 171, § 12.18, at 898. The parties' characterization of the stipulated
sum as "liquidated damages" or as a "penalty" is not controlling. The court will decide, based
on the reality of the transaction, whether the provision represents permissible liquidated
damages or an unlawful penalty. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 171, § 12.18, at 898-99.
205. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 2-3 (1981) (introductory note to ch. 8); E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 171, § 5.1, at 325; Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.
REV. 365, 366-67 (1921); see also, e.g., Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19
L.R.-Eq. 462, 465 (1875); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v.
Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 605-07, 386 A.2d 1216, 1228-29 (1978).
206. See, e.g., Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); Robinson v. United
States, 261 U.S. 486 (1923).
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government. 2°7  The public policy against enforcement of penalties
will, therefore, not apply to the type of penalty involved in the govern-
mental wager.
The governmental wager thus does not offend any general princi-
ples of contract law, and the public policies against enforcement of
penalties or gambling contracts would not be implicated. In any
event, even if one were to analogize wagering with government to a
game of chance, games of chance are lawful if authorized by the legis-
lature. Statutorily authorized lotteries, or pari-mutual wagering on
horse or dog racing, for example, are lawful rather than unlawful
gambling. Indeed, the government has used lotteries, which clearly
are games of chance, in a number of contexts to allocate scarce
resources or governmental benefits, such as public housing, 208 or even
to impose burdens, such as the draft or jury duty.2°9 Not only have
these uses survived judicial challenge, but expanded use of the lottery
by the government has been advocated in several areas as the fairest
method of making certain allocation decisions,210 such as liquor and
broadcast licensing21I and decisionmaking about the use of kidney
dialysis treatment, where patient need far exceeds the available sup-
ply. 212 In a sense, these uses of the lottery can be seen as gambling,
207. See Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 425, 361
N.E.2d 1015, 1018, 393 N.Y.S.2d 365, 369 (1977).
208. See Greely, The Equality of Allocation by Lot, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 113
(1977). Indeed, courts have suggested that "in cases where many candidates are equally
qualified ... further selections be made in some reasonable manner such as 'by lot.'" Holmes
v. New York Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) (allocation of low-rent public
housing) (quoting Hornsby v. Allen, 330 F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1964) (involving the allocation
of liquor licenses)); see also Star Television, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 416
F.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., dissenting) (discussing random allocation of
broadcasting licenses), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969); cf Winick, supra note 105, at 415-17.
209. Winick, supra note 105, at 417 n.467. In the face of an equal protection challenge, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the draft lottery, under which persons available
for induction into the armed services are chosen in order of birthdates selected by lottery. See
United States v. Johnson, 473 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1972). The government chooses grand and
petit jury pools through random selection, see 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (1988), which is thought to
avoid the arbitrary exclusion from the jury of any particular class of persons. See, e.g., United
States v. Davis, 518 F.2d 81 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 997 (1977). Selection by lot also
long has been appropriate in the desperate situation when shipwrecked lifeboat occupants have
run out of food. See United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No.
15,383).
210. See Greely, supra note 208; Winick, supra note 105, at 416. One empirical study
revealed that candidates for an innovative educational program perceived random assignment
as the fairest method of selection. Wortman & Rabinowitz, Random Assignment: The Fairest
of Them All, in PROCEEDINGS AND BACKGROUND PAPERS: CONFERENCE ON ETHICAL AND
LEGAL PROBLEMS IN APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH §§ 15-1 to 15-10 (1979).
211. See Greely, supra note 208.
212. See P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 247
(1970); Freund, Introduction to EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS at xvii (1969).
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but they are not unlawful gambling. Surely, like the use of lotteries in
these areas, the legislature could authorize governmental wagering to
accomplish certain limited social objectives consistent with maintain-
ing prohibitions on traditional gambling. The determination of which
social goals are appropriate ones for the utilization of this technique
would be made either by the legislature, or by a governmental agency
pursuant to power delegated to the agency by the legislature with a
specification of standards for its exercise.
B. The Prohibition on Bribery
Is wagering by the government to induce behavioral change a
form of bribery to persuade people to do what they should do any-
way? Although some will no doubt criticize my proposal on this
ground, the payoff for successful completion of the goal cannot be
considered a bribe in the sense of the criminal prohibition, which is
limited to inducements given to someone in a position of trust to influ-
ence him to act dishonestly or corruptly.21 a Wagering to induce drug
addicts to refrain from drug use or civil servants to perform more
productively is no more a bribe than are tax incentives given to busi-
nesses to induce them to engage in research activities,214 to homeown-
ers to induce them to install energy conservation devices in their
homes,1 or to builders to induce them to construct or rehabilitate
low-income housing.216 Moreover, such governmental wagering
would seem no more a bribe than the government's offer of a reward
for the capture of a wanted fugitive, such as the highly publicized
1989 offer of one million dollars for the capture of General Manuel
Antonio Noriega.217
The wisdom of utilizing wagering with the government to accom-
plish any particular purpose is ultimately a question that will be
resolved by the political process. Perhaps several of the applications
of the technique discussed here as illustrations will prove too unpopu-
lar to be authorized. I assume that the political process will anticipate
or respond to strongly held public attitudes on which goals are inap-
propriate for the utilization of governmental wagering, and that legis-
latures or administrative agencies can be relied upon to avoid using
But see E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION: RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN
LAW 71 (1955).
213. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 838.016 (1989).
214. See I.R.C. § 41 (1989).
215. See id. § 23.
216. See id. § 42.
217. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
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the technique for such goals or to respond quickly to correct choices
that prove unpopular.
It may be useful in this context to posit the existence of a baseline
for determining the propriety of the kinds of behavior that will qualify
for reward eligibility through use of the wagering technique. Several
of the problems discussed here as candidates for governmental wager-
ing, such as improving job performance or individual health, involve
conduct that is not itself unlawful, antisocial, or even deviant, but
which we would nonetheless like to change. Here we are willing to
provide incentives to improve conduct that may not itself be subject to
condemnation. On the other hand, some of the social problems dis-
cussed here, such as drug addiction, driving while intoxicated, or
police misconduct, involve conduct that is prohibited, antisocial, or
deviant. For some of this behavior we would be willing to use wager-
ing in effect to bring conduct up to the baseline; for others, however,
we would not, feeling that it is inappropriate to reward people for
following rules that others follow as a matter of course. Again, public
attitudes ultimately will determine which kinds of conduct falling
below the baseline are proper candidates for the governmental wager
and which are not, and to the extent that a consensus emerges, the
relevant governmental agency may set standards, perhaps through
public rulemaking procedures,"'8 for the use of wagering.
C. The Constitutionality of the Governmental Wager
Is governmental wagering of the type discussed here unconstitu-
tional? Does it involve a coercive application of governmental power
to infringe individual liberty? Undoubtedly, for at least some poor
people, the promise of a large monetary reward might seem to be, in
the words of the Godfather, an offer they cannot refuse,219 and, hence,
the functional equivalent of governmental coercion. For reasons dis-
cussed earlier, irresistible inducements should be avoided in order to
minimize the potential for engendering feelings of psychological pres-
sure, which can have a counterproductive effect, perhaps creating a
negative "psychological reactance. ' 220 Coercion, alternatively, can
trigger a form of the "overjustification effect" in which the individual
may accomplish the specified goal, but because he attributes his
218. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988) (notice and
comment rulemaking); FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1989) (same); REV. MODEL STATE ADMIN.
PROCEDURE ACT §§ 3-103 to 3-106 (1981) (West Supp. 1990) (same). See generally J.
O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING (1983).
219. M. Puzo, THE GODFATHER 89 (Fawcet Crest ed. 1969) ("'He's a businessman,' the
Don said blandly. 'I'll make him an offer he can't refuse.' ").
220. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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behavior to external pressure, will not experience any lasting attitudi-
nal or behavioral change.221
In any event, the inducements of the wager, no matter how tanta-
lizing, would not be found illegal. The courts have never treated mere
financial (or even non-financial) inducements as governmental coer-
cion rising to the level of unconstitutionality. Society is pervaded by
governmental incentives designed to induce a variety of behaviors and
attitudes. For example, the government offers businessmen tax cred-
its designed to spur certain activities,222 awards students "A's" if they
perform well in school, offers army recruits bonuses and other incen-
tives to persuade them to enlist, and induces criminal defendants to
enter guilty pleas by prosecutorial offers of charge-reduction or sen-
tence recommendation. Further, the government induces people to
play the state lottery by offering million-dollar jackpots, the proceeds
of which are used to fund public education. Finally, the state awards
prison inmates "good time" credit toward parole eligibility for good
conduct, and participation in rehabilitative programs as "a tangible
reward for positive efforts made during incarceration. ' 223 Although,
in each of these cases, the government provides rewards for the
explicit purpose of inducing or reinforcing certain behavior, few
would contend that these positive reinforcements constitute imper-
22425missible coercion or violate the Constitution.225
As previously discussed, the governmental wager may be seen as
an application of learning theory combining positive reinforcement
and aversive conditioning. The empirical evidence suggests a strik-
221. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
223. N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 260.1(a) (1983).
224. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (plea bargaining offers); Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (plea of guilty in response to statutory discrepancy in
penalty available to those convicted versus those pleading guilty); see also A. WERTHEIMER,
supra note 104, at 172, 267-68, 287, 301, 308 (legal and philosophical analysis of coercion
arguing that in the case of proposals or offers, coercion should be limited to proposals that are
illegal or immoral); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-76 (1981) (standard
of duress limited to physical compulsion or improper threats). See generally supra notes 101-
11 and accompanying text (analyzing concepts of voluntariness and coercion in the context of
the governmental wager).
225. As the United States Supreme Court stated:
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected
activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with
legislative policy. Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed
to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977) (footnotes omitted); accord Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 (1989); see also Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759
(1991).
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ingly high success rate with clinical applications of these behavioral
approaches in the treatment of a variety of conditions.226 However, it
appears that these behavioral techniques work only with cooperative
patients, and successful treatment cannot be forced on patients
against their will. 227 Although conditioning techniques frequently are
portrayed as having the dramatic power to induce change automati-
cally, without the cooperation of the subject, such as in Anthony Bur-
gess' novel, A Clockwork Orange,228 these techniques do not in fact
have such powerful effects.
Cognitive psychology has shown that, rather than occurring
automatically, conditioning is cognitively mediated.229  Albert
Bandura, long a student of behavioral theory, has dispelled the
"mechanistic metaphor" often associated with the process of
conditioning:
Explanations of reinforcement originally assumed that conse-
quences increased behavior without conscious involvement. The
still prevalent notion that reinforcers can operate insidiously
arouses fears that improved techniques of reinforcement will
enable authorities to manipulate people without their knowledge or
consent. Although the empirical issue is not yet completely
resolved, there is little evidence that rewards function as automatic
strengtheners of human conduct .... After individuals discern the
instrumental relationship between action and outcome, contingent
rewards may produce accommodating or oppositional behavior
depending on how they value the incentives, the influencers and
the behavior itself, and how others respond. Thus reinforcement,
as it has become better understood, has changed from a mechanical
strengthener of conduct to an informative and motivating
influence.23°
Reinforcers, under the emerging cognitive paradigm, are
regarded as "motivators," depending for their success on the "incen-
tive preferences of those undergoing change. ' 231 Behavioral condi-
tioning, with few exceptions,232 cannot succeed absent the conscious
involvement and cooperation of the individual, who remains free to
226. See NIMH BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-11.
227. See E. ERWIN, BEHAVIOR THERAPY: SCIENTIFIC, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND MORAL
FOUNDATIONS 180 (1978); Beck, supra note 2, at 502-03; Marks, The Current Status of
Behavioral Psychotherapy: Theory and Practice, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 253, 255 (1976);
Winick, supra note 105, at 360; and Winick, Right to Refuse, supra note 50, at 80.
228. A. BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1963).
229. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
230. Bandura, supra note 51, at 860.
231. Id. at 862; see also Winick, supra note 105, at 360-61; Winick, Right to Refuse, supra
note 50, at 80.
232. See, e.g., Lepper, Zanna & Abelson, Cognitive Irreversibility in a Dissonance-Reduction
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decline the positive reinforcer or receive the aversive consequence
without changing his behavior. It is therefore extremely doubtful that
courts would regard inducements to behavioral change provided by
the governmental wager as sufficiently coercive to trigger constitu-
tional condemnation.
Moreover, because acceptance of the wager is within the volun-
tary control of the individual, the Constitution would not be infringed
by governmental applications of this technique to accomplish social
goals. Individuals may possess a number of constitutional rights that
they are asked to forego as a condition for entering into a wager with
the government, such as the right to refuse to submit to periodic drug
testing.2 33 With a limited number of exceptions, however, constitu-
tional rights are waiveable.234 Criminal defendants who enter guilty
pleas, for example, waive a number of fundamental rights under the
fifth and sixth amendments, including the right to effective assistance
of counsel, to trial by jury, to confrontation of adverse witnesses, and
to avoid self-incrimination. 23 In upholding the constitutionality of
plea bargaining, the United States Supreme Court specified the ele-
ments of an effective waiver: "Waivers of constitutional rights not
only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely con-
sequences. ' '236 This formulation is consonant with the Court's tradi-
tional waiver standard that requires the government to prove the
existence of "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege. ' 237 Because a condition of the governmen-
tal wager proposed here is that it be voluntary, an individual entering
into such an arrangement would be explicitly waiving any constitu-
tional rights he might otherwise have, to avoid doing something
required by the wager contract-for example, by submitting to peri-
odic drug testing. Particularly where the wager calls for the foregoing
of a constitutional privilege, the contingency contract should explic-
Situation, 16 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 191 (1970) (conditioning can occur
without conscious awareness).
233. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
234. See Winick, supra note 105, at 383.
235. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
236. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
237. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver of sixth amendment right to
counsel) cited in Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 n.6. See also, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972) (standard for waiver of notice in conditional sales contract); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (upholding validity of forum selection clause); D. Overmyer Co.
v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (upholding validity of cognovit note); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966) (standard for waiver of right not to make a statement to police
during custodial interrogation).
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itly advise the individual that, by entering into the agreement, he is
voluntarily relinquishing such a privilege. As long as the individual
voluntarily and knowingly agrees, such a waiver should be constitu-
tionally unobjectionable.
V. CONCLUSION
I have suggested that the government may harness the power of
the wager to motivate individuals to undertake behavioral changes
deemed desirable by government and to help bring about these
changes. Government has long been in the business of social engi-
neering, and at this late date there should be no controversy about the
legitimacy of the government attempting to achieve certain social
goals--such as curtailing drug addiction, increasing public employee
productivity, encouraging employment, improving public health,
decreasing the school dropout rate, and lessening recidivism by crimi-
nal offenders. The means used to achieve these goals, however, have
not always been effective. The technique I suggest, adapting princi-
ples of behavioral, cognitive, and social psychology to accomplish
social goals, can be seen as an application of what David Wexler and I
call "therapeutic jurisprudence. '238 As I have argued, if governmen-
tal wagering is properly carried out, it can be a more effective, less
coercive approach to accomplish social goals that violates neither con-
stitutional nor contract law prohibitions. Constitutional and contract
law principles are sufficiently elastic to permit such social experimen-
238. See D. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC
AGENT (1990); D. WEXLER & B. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991);
Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied (June 25, 1988) (unpublished paper presented at
XIV International Congress of the International Academy of Law and Mental Health,
Montreal, Canada) (available on file at University of Miami Law Review). Professor Wexler
and I have discerned in our individual work in mental health law a common concern for
analyzing the therapeutic impact of legal rules. Is a particular legal rule, either presently in
effect or proposed, therapeutic or antitherapeutic to patients, and to society as a whole? In our
view, legal decisionmaking should consider not only economic factors, public safety, and the
protection of individual rights; it also should take into account the therapeutic implications of
a rule and its alternatives. See, e.g., Wexler, Grave Disability and Family Therapy: The
Therapeutic Potential of Civil Libertarian Commitment Codes, 9 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 39
(1986); Wexler, Patients, Therapists, and Third Parties: The Victimological Virtues of Tarasoff,
2 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 1 (1979); Wexler & Schopp, supra note 50; Winick, Competency to
Consent, supra note 50; Winick, Competency to Consent to Involuntary Hospitalization: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 169
(1991); Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a
Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1987); Winick, supra note 138; B. Winick, The
Right to Refuse Treatment: Constitutional Limitations on Mental Health and Correctional
Therapy (unpublished manuscript). Professor Wexler and I believe that clinical and empirical
insights from the mental health disciplines should be used in shaping mental health law and
law in general to increase its potential as a therapeutic agent. We have come to call this insight
"therapeutic jurisprudence."
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tation in the public interest. A therapeutic jurisprudence would thus
sanction creative use of the wager, thereby recognizing the potential
of law as an instrument of social and individual change and as a thera-
peutic agent.
We are in a period of heightened concern about social problems,
which seem to be dramatically increasing in both number and com-
plexity. Crime, drug addiction, alcoholism, AIDS, homelessness,
environmental pollution, and increasing social and individual pathol-
ogy often seem to be problems beyond our grasp, although increased
resources freed up by the decreased defense spending that should fol-
low the end of the prolonged Cold War and the cessation of hostilities
in the Persian Gulf could create new opportunities. We also are in a
period of increased threat to civil liberties, as more and more Ameri-
cans seem willing to trade away certain constitutional protections to
enhance law enforcement efforts in the war on crime and drugs.
239
And this threat is a serious one, given an increasingly conservative
Supreme Court. The Court is the institution in American life that
historically has functioned as the guardian of constitutional liberties
in times of crisis, or at least it is supposed to play this role. The Court
today, however, is more deferential to autonomy of the states and of
the coordinate branches of government than to individual rights, as
evidenced by its increased willingness to sanction the use of extreme
measures to solve social problems. 2" The wagering program pro-
posed here is an alternative approach to solving social problems that
is less intrusive on constitutional values than more coercive and
extreme measures principally because its hallmark is voluntariness.
Because it attacks the causes of social problems by seeking to moti-
vate personal change, rather than treating their effects, governmental
wagering is a program that deserves to be tried.
As indicated earlier, the ideas advanced in this Article are
exploratory, and are offered in the hope of stimulating dialogue. We
need to view social problems differently if we are to succeed in craft-
ing new solutions. Whether these theoretical proposals would work,
particularly for seriously disadvantaged populations, remains to be
tested, and I hope that they will encourage not only discussion, but
also pilot projects by governmental agencies or the private sector in a
variety of areas to permit their empirical examination. Indeed, given
the budgetary deficits many state and local governmental entities face,
239. See Wicker, supra note 112, at 23.
240. See Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (authorizing involuntary
psychotropic medication of competent prisoner for security purposes); Stanford v. Kentucky,
109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989) (permitting capital punishment of juveniles); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.
Ct. 2934 (1989) (permitting capital punishment of mentally retarded defendants).
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this may be an excellent opportunity for public spirited businesses or
private groups to forge a creative public/private partnership in which
business and industry, foundations and private philanthropy, religious
and community organizations, and union and other trust funds con-
tribute the resources and creative non-monetary reinforcers needed to
permit the wagering approach to be tested, and to be expanded if suc-
cessful.24 A behavioral incentive to such private generosity already
exists, of course-the charitable deduction from taxable income.242
In many ways, the bet is a metaphor for the way life is. We learn
to consider and set goals and we observe the instrumental connection
between the efforts we are willing to put forth to achieve them and the
probability and desirability of their attainment. As we mature, we
learn what pleases us and what displeases us, and how to obtain the
former and to avoid the latter. We learn to balance short-term utility
against long-term objectives. Many never learn these basic lessons
and, as a result, develop maladaptive behavior patterns that impede
their ability to live reasonably happy, productive, and self-fulfilling
lives. Some learn patterns of helplessness and never develop many of
the functional capacities necessary for successful living. Feeling
themselves to be subject to external forces beyond their control, they
become apathetic and resigned. For some, these deficits are due to
lack of exposure to opportunities to learn; for others, they are due to a
failure to master the basic skills of learning itself. In some cases, the
lack of opportunity to learn is due to the unresponsiveness of social
systems and the existence of systemic obstacles to exposure to learn-
ing opportunities. 24 3 The bet described herein has the potential for
reaching out to those who have failed to acquire these basic skills, and
suffer social, health, occupational, or educational problems as a result.
It also has the potential for breaking down the social barriers that
impede learning.
The bet makes explicit the goal and the consequences of its
attainment or non-attainment. For those who choose to seek its
attainment, the bet facilitates their appreciation of the instrumental
value of their efforts. The bet harnesses the power of individual
241. See Hinds, supra note 64, at 10, col. 1 (describing contributions by local businesses to
Philadelphia high school incentive program to decrease the school dropout rate). These
contributions could include certificates redeemable for records, pizzas, and tickets to movies,
rock concerts, and sporting events.
242. See I.R.C. § 170 (1989).
243. See A. BANDURA, supra note 12, at 413; Gurin & Brim, Change in Self in Adulthood:
The Example of Sense of Control, in 6 LiFE-SPAN DEV. & BEHAV. 281 (1984); Gurin, Gurin &
Morrison, Personal and Ideological Aspects of Internal and External Control, 41 Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 275 (1978).
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choice and stimulates intrinsic motivation. Not only can the bet help
people to master specific skills or achieve particular goals, but it also
can teach them much more. It can teach them how to develop gen-
eral strategies for setting and achieving personal goals, and in the pro-
cess, free them from many of their problems, enabling them to achieve
their potential. It can teach them much about life and how to enjoy
it, to the ultimate enrichment of the individual and the community.
In short, this can be a bet in which we all can win and no one must
lose.
